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ABSTRACT
This study seeks to demonstrate how the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-05 wrought a profound change in American policy 
toward East Asia in general and Japan in particular. Prior 
to 1904, leaders in Washington perceived the nations of 
Europe to be the primary threat to America's burgeoning 
commercial and strategic interests in China. Seizures of 
Chinese territory by Germany, France, Britain, and Russia at 
the end of the nineteenth century underscored this belief. 
Secretary of State John Hay admonished these nations with 
his "Open Door" notes of 1899-1900, confident that words 
alone could restrain nations whose military power was widely 
dispersed over vast territorial realms. The United States 
had little else with which to defend its interests in the 
region.
Japan's stunning victory over Russia in 1904-05 
shattered this complacency, as the formidable armed might of 
the island nation achieved virtual dominance of Korea, 
Manchuria, and the western Pacific Ocean. Unencumbered by an 
expansive empire, Japan could, unlike the imperial nations 
of Europe, concentrate its entire armed strength in East 
Asia, thereby posing an unprecedented threat to the Open 
Door policy.
In the summer of 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt 
sought to mediate a timely peace settlement between the 
belligerents, fearing that prolongation of hostilities would 
result in complete Japanese domination of East Asia. He 
envisioned a postwar balance of power in which Russia and 
Japan would preserve the Open Door in China by mutually 
checking each other's expansionist tendencies. At the same 
time, Roosevelt recognized that Hay's precepts required 
modification to acknowledge Japan's territorial ambitions in 
Korea and southern Manchuria. The tenuous peace that was 
framed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire that August represented 
an attempt to reconcile American and Japanese objectives in 
East Asia. ___________________
Japan's military prowess also alarmed American leaders, 
who were only too aware of the virtual defenselessness of 
America's recent insular acquisitions in the Pacific Ocean, 
and of the decrepit state of American armed forces. With 
mixed results, Washington implored its citizens to recognize 
the necessity of abandoning their ingrained sense of 
isolation from international events and of effecting drastic 
improvements in American armed strength.
v
INTRODUCTION:
MOMENTARY OPTIMISM:
JOHN HAY CONFRONTS THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE
IN CHINA, 1899-1900
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 signalled a new era 
in the relationship between Japan and the United States. 
Japan's remarkable victory in that war, the first successful 
Asian counterstrike against Western penetration, established 
Japan as the dominant power in East Asia and the western 
Pacific region. Previously, the latter decades of the 
nineteenth century had witnessed the simultaneous emergence 
of Japan and the United States as major industrial powers, 
and also the beginning of their determined participation in 
the international contest for political and economic 
influence in East Asia. Until 1904, however, American 
leaders assumed that their chief adversaries in this 
competition were the nations of Europe. The small Asian 
island nation, though emerging from its centuries-old cocoon 
of feudal isolation, largely escaped Washington's attention.
Events occurring at the end of the nineteenth century 
encouraged this perception. In 1894-95, Japan waged a 
stunning war against China, only to dilute its terms of 
peace at the concerted insistence of Russia, France, and 
Germany. Merely two years later, expansionist Europeans, 
-emboldened -by-the- Sino-Japanese War's demonstration of 
Chinese weakness, embarked upon a new series of territorial 
aggrandizements against the dying Qing Dynasty. In 1897, 
Russia occupied the Liaodong Peninsula and its harbor at 
Port Arthur.1 The following year, Germany seized the ports
of Qingdao and Jiaozhou on the Shandong Peninsula, thereby 
rendering the approach by sea to the Chinese capital of 
Beijing dominated by European forces.2
Also in 1898, American forces easily ended more than 
three centuries of Spanish rule in Guam and the Philippine 
archipelago, replacing it with American governance.3 Having 
thus gained the final insular "stepping stones" to the Asian 
continent by 1899, American leaders believed themselves able 
to dictate the terms of international activity in China. 
Although the United States lacked sufficient strength in 
East Asia to enforce its will there, Washington noted that 
its European rivals similarly wielded little power in that 
region, since their armed forces were dispersed in the 
defense of far-flung empires throughout the world. The 
ambitious "Open Door" Notes of 1899 and 1900, and also the 
participation of American forces in the international 
suppression of China's nationalistic "Boxer Rebellion" in 
1900, reflected American determination to prevent the 
European political and commercial domination of China. 
Russian occupation of Manchuria in the aftermath of the 
Boxer Rebellion symbolized this continual European threat 
for the leaders in Washington.4
The war between Japan and Russia shattered this 
American fixation upon European schemes in East Asia. 
Although, prior to 1904, many Americans had predicted that
4Russia, then the largest military power in the world, would 
crush the upstart Japanese in an armed confrontation, the 
initial Japanese triumphs at sea and on land in February of 
that year elicited the nearly universal, if surprised, 
approval of American leaders. President Theodore Roosevelt, 
long an admirer of Japan, particularly applauded the opening 
Japanese successes, perceiving them as serving the purpose 
of the "Open Door" policy. Impressed, he quickly sent 
journalists and American military personnel to observe and 
report the operations of the Japanese armies as they 
subsequently advanced through Korea and Manchuria. The 
leaders in Tokyo, perceiving the United States as a 
potential arbiter between Japan and Russia, reciprocated by 
sending to Washington a special envoy whose mission was to 
gain American support for their cause. Initially, Japan's 
"diplomatic offensive" easily won converts among prominent 
Americans who were repelled by the repressive and 
incompetent Russian government in St. Petersburg, and 
attracted by the progressive image which Meiji Japan 
projectedT Ironically, however, Japan's military success 
against Russia eventually undermined the rapport between 
Japan and the United States. American observers' accounts of 
fanatically patriotic Japanese soldiers and sailors 
achieving an almost unbroken series of spectacular victories 
produced grave apprehensions in Washington through the
5succeeding months. Although elated by Japan's rapid 
elimination of Russian preponderance in Manchuria, which 
served the American quest for an "Open Door" in China, 
American leaders began to fear a potential Japanese threat 
to the tenuous position of the United States in East Asia. 
Unlike the European nations, Japan could bring its entire 
military might to bear in defense of its growing interests 
on the Asian continent. Despite the strenuous diplomatic 
endeavors of Japan, several influential individuals in the 
United States eventually resurrected the specter of a 
"Yellow Peril," warning apocalyptically that Japan, drunk 
with its victory over Russia, might threaten all other 
Western claims in East Asia, including the ill-defended 
Philippine archipelago.
Subsequent American policy toward East Asia in general 
and Japan in particular reflected this fear. Roosevelt, in 
mediating the peace negotiations between Russia and Japan in 
the summer of 1905, sought to balance the strength of the 
two nations in the contested area, rather than allow Japan 
tosupplant Russiathere completely. Thereafter, he proved 
willing to abandon to a significant extent Washington's 
commitment to preserving the "Open Door" in China, realizing 
that American rhetoric proved no match for Japanese 
strength. Postwar American agreements with Japan, though 
invoking that ideal, nevertheless acknowledged a Japanese
"sphere of influence" which included Korea and southern 
Manchuria. American leaders sought in return for this 
concession assurances that Japan would respect the United 
States' "sphere of influence" in East Asia and the western 
Pacific Ocean. Simultaneously, Roosevelt urged Congress and 
American military officials to bolster the defenses of the 
nation's insular possessions and to augment its navy with 
new and larger vessels. His efforts met with varying degrees 
of success. This tacit admission of Japanese primacy in East 
Asia characterized America's transpacific relations for the 
next four decades.
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CHAPTER I:
THERE CAN BE NONE MORE DANGEROUS IN ALL THE WORLD"
AMERICAN WITNESS TO JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 1904-1905
Japan's decision to plunge into hostilities with Russia 
in 1904 resulted from the latter's recent provocative 
incursions into the easternmost reaches of the Asian 
continent. The leaders in Tokyo had long smoldered with 
resentment toward Russia for its complicity in the dilution 
of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (which ended the Sino-Japanese 
War) in 1895, and for its subsequent seizure of the very 
territory which the European coalition had denied Japan. 
Moreover, Russian meddling in Korea after Japanese forces 
had eliminated Chinese influence there in 1895 continued to 
render the peninsula a dangerous threat to Japan's national 
security. Lastly, Russia's occupation of Manchuria in 1900 
solidified the fears of Japanese leaders who envisioned 
eventual Russian domination of the Asian continent.
While preparing to combat the largest military power in 
the world through 1903 and the beginning of 1904, however, 
Japan's leaders grew aware of their inability to wage a 
protracted war against it. Despite glaring inadequacies in 
Russian logistics, as exemplified by the existence of only 
one isolated railroad connecting distant western Russia with 
Manchuria,1 the government in Tokyo realized that, given- 
sufficient time, the Russians would be able to amass an 
overwhelming concentration of land forces in the eastern 
hinterland that would swallow any army that Japan could 
deploy. Japan would therefore need to launch its operations
in the winter, when the weather hampered the mobility of the 
lone Trans-Siberian Railway, and then strive to win local 
superiority quickly.2 Furthermore, prior to commencing 
hostilities with Russia, Japanese leaders searched for a 
neutral nation that would offer to mediate a peace 
settlement once Japanese forces had gained supremacy in the 
theater of operations, and before substantial Russian 
reinforcements from the west could turn the tide. The United 
States seemed the most apt choice for the role of an 
impartial arbiter to the men in Tokyo. Britain, an ally of 
Japan, could not mediate without provoking Russian protest. 
France was an ally of Russia, and was therefore undesirable 
to the Japanese. Lastly, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany had 
been encouraging his cousin Tsar Nicholas II to pursue his 
quixotic dreams of building a Russian Far Eastern Empire, in 
order to draw the latter's attention and resources away from 
Europe.3
Prerequisite to enlisting the services of the United 
States, Japan needed to send a special envoy to Washington 
to plead its-case-: The Marquis Ito Hirobumi, Japan's senior 
statesman, selected Viscount Kaneko Kentaro, a former 
Harvard classmate of President Theodore Roosevelt.4 
Receiving his instructions directly from Ito on February 4, 
1904, Kaneko initially expressed profound doubts about the 
prospects of winning American support, believing that the
United States had strong affinities with Russia. He noted 
that, in 1863, during the American Civil War, several 
vessels of the Russian navy had sailed into New York harbor, 
a gesture which many Americans had misinterpreted as a show 
of support for the Union (although, in actuality, the 
Russian ships had been searching for a neutral port at a 
time in which Britain threatened war with Russia in order to 
prevent Russian domination of Poland).5 Moreover, Kaneko 
knew of familial and business ties binding wealthy Americans 
and Russian aristocrats.6 Disconsolately, he told Ito, "No 
matter how eloquently I may speak in America, I could not 
possibly draw it away from Russia."7 Nevertheless, with a 
desperate determination, Kaneko began his journey across the 
Pacific Ocean to the "Land of Darkness" on February 24,
1904.8
Kaneko need not have worried. Any sentimental bonds 
that existed between the United States and Russia had 
dissolved by early 1904. Anti-Semitic atrocities in Russia 
repelled many in the United States. In April, 1902, 
horrified-Americans had learned of the massacre of Jews in 
the Bessarabian capital of Kishinev by the local Christian 
inhabitants.9 President Roosevelt perceived such barbarity 
as symptomatic of a corrupt, incompetent government. In 
private letters to Secretary of State John Hay and others, 
he dismissed Tsar Nicholas II as "a preposterous little
11
creature” and asserted that "no human beings, black, yellow, 
or white could be quite as untruthful, as insincere, as 
arrogant - in short, as untrustworthy in every way - as the 
Russians under the present system."10 For Roosevelt, a 
prime example of Russian perfidy was St. Petersburg's 
refusal to withdraw its forces from Manchuria, despite 
earlier promises to Beijing made in the aftermath of the 
Boxer Rebellion to relinquish control of the region to 
China. Continued Russian occupation of Manchuria also 
jeopardized the "Open Door" policy objectives of the United 
States.
To Kaneko's pleasant surprise, Roosevelt and many other 
influential Americans applauded the Asian David that was 
courageously confronting the European Goliath. In the White 
House, Kaneko's former classmate, who had read widely about 
Japan, deeply admired the Japanese societal values embodied 
in the code of bushido and was profoundly impressed by 
Japan's rapid modernization.11 In early February, 1904, 
prior to Kaneko's arrival in the United States, Oscar
 Strausyaclose friend and advisor of Roosevelt, sent to the
White House a letter which closed by saying, "Japan is 
certainly battling on the side of civilization - may wisdom 
and victory be on her side."12 Roosevelt himself exulted 
that "Japan is playing our game (on behalf of the Open Door 
principle)" by challenging the Russian presence in East
12
Asia.13 Kaneko found the people outside the nation's 
capital equally receptive. Many Americans somewhat naively 
attributed to Japanese leaders altruistic motives on behalf 
of Chinese nationhood. American business leaders 
enthusiastically received articles and speeches from the 
Japanese envoy, in which he envisioned future collaboration 
between Japan and the United States in furthering 
international commerce in East Asia.14 Several prominent 
American bankers, angered by the plight of Russian Jews and 
by Russia's heavy-handed conduct in Asia, expressed to 
Kaneko their interest in extending loans to Tokyo to help 
Japan finance its war.15 Some Americans harbored such 
hatred toward Russia that they were willing to go even 
further on Japan's behalf. Three thousand American Jews 
formed a volunteer army to assist the Japanese forces. Other 
Americans offered to donate a United States warship to 
Japan's navy.16 As the historian Kamikawa Hikomatsu has 
noted, "American public opinion was favorable to Japan 
partly out of self interest and curiosity, but chiefly out 
ofdisinterested moralindignation at Russia."17
Such outpourings of support for Japan continued 
undiminished even after Americans learned of Japan's 
unorthodox manner of commencing hostilities. On the night of 
February 8, 1904, a squadron of Japanese destroyers from the 
fleet of Admiral Togo Heihachiro suddenly attacked the
13
Russian Far Eastern Fleet stationed at Port Arthur, 
inflicting serious damage upon three Russian vessels. This 
assault, an attempt to gain naval supremacy in the theater 
of operations, preceded Tokyo's formal declaration of war by 
two days.18 Earlier that day, the first Japanese ground 
forces had landed at Chemulpo (Inchon) on Korea's west 
coast. The next day, February 9, another Japanese naval 
detachment destroyed the three Russian warships stationed at 
Chemulpo. These acts violated Korean neutrality.19 St. 
Petersburg angrily accused the 11 insolent” Japanese of 
“treachery. ,|2°
Although some Americans criticized Japan for its 
abandonment of the conventional rules of war, they were in a 
distinct minority. In a letter to his son, Theodore, Jr., 
dated February 10, President Roosevelt affirmed that he "was 
thoroughly well pleased with the Japanese victory" at Port 
Arthur, and remarked that "the supine carelessness (of the 
Russians) is well-nigh incredible."21 Five days later,
Elihu Root, who had recently resigned his position as 
t— Secretary of War,— sent Roosevelt a letter in which he asked 
approvingly, "Was not the way the Japs began the fight 
bully?"22 American newspapers echoed this sentiment, 
disparaging Russia for its lack of preparation. An editorial 
appearing in the New York Times on February 10 praised the 
"prompt, enterprising, and gallant feat of the Japanese
14
arms" and presciently observed that "the moral effect of 
this victory is of course immeasurably greater than its 
material consequences.1,23 The next day, the Times scolded 
the Russians for charging Japan of wrongdoing:
It seems hardly to become the dignity of the ruler 
of a great nation to complain that he has been 
struck before he was quite ready...If Russia has 
been caught unprepared, the fault is surely her 
own. She has been protracting negotiations which 
it was quite evident could come to nothing...If 
Admiral (Evgeny) Alexeiev (the Russian Viceroy in 
the Far East, and the overall commander of all 
Russian naval and land forces there) did not have 
his preparations made and his searchlights going 
when the Japanese torpedo boats attacked him, he 
has nobody but himself to blame.24
Similar tactics would elicit a dramatically different 
response from the United States when they were later used 
against the American Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor 
on December 7, 1941.
Washington's first official priority following the 
outbreak of the war was the preservation of the neutrality 
of the United States and its insular possessions in the_____
Pacific Ocean. Roosevelt proclaimed American neutrality on 
February 15, 1904, severely limiting the access of 
belligerent vessels to ports owned by the United States.25 
Further, pursuant to limiting the geographical scope of 
hostilities and to maintaining the "Open Door" policy in
China, American leaders ambitiously sought to uphold the 
neutrality of Chinese territory outside of Manchuria. On 
February 10, Secretary of State Hay sent a proclamation of 
Chinese neutrality to the belligerent capitals, as well as 
to Berlin, Paris, and London; all subsequently indicated 
agreement.26 Such assertions reflected the continuing 
beliefs in Washington that the United States could shape 
international behavior in East Asia with words alone, and 
that Europe should be the prime recipient of its 
admonitions.
The course of hostilities at sea and on land shattered 
these assumptions. As the custodian of American interests in 
the Pacific and East Asia, the American navy frequently 
proved unable to assert its role, especially as Japanese 
naval power gained dominance in the northwestern Pacific.
The first indication of this trend was the Japanese naval 
assault upon Russian warships in Chemulpo (Inchon) on 
February 8-9, 1904. Though the Russians bravely steamed out 
of the Korean harbor to face destruction, Korean neutrality 
had become the first casualty of the conflict. One week 
later, the first division of soldiers that would 
comprise the Japanese First Army under the command of 
General Kuroki Tametomo landed at the embattled port. On 
February 25, Japanese forces in Seoul exacted from the 
Korean government a treaty which transformed the peninsula
into a Japanese protectorate.27 Ultimately, Roosevelt 
acknowledged Japanese hegemony over Korea, "which has shown 
its utter inability to stand by itself."28
Through subsequent months, Japanese naval superiority 
in the area of hostilities continued to grow as Togo strove 
to trap the Russian Far Eastern Fleet in Port Arthur. The 
effects of this accruement of strength eventually 
compromised Chinese neutrality, American protests 
notwithstanding. The final Japanese naval blow against the 
ill-fated Port Arthur Fleet occurred on August 10, 1904, as 
the Russian ships made a desperate dash for the freedom of 
the northern port of Vladivostok. En route, they encountered 
the bulk of Togo's fleet in the Yellow Sea. Though both 
navies sustained heavy damage in the ensuing engagement, the 
result was another Japanese victory. Their admiral killed, 
most of the battered Russian vessels retreated to Port 
Arthur, where they remained for the duration of the war; the 
other Russian ships fled toward neutral harbors along the 
Asian coast.29
------- Therein lay the rub. Most of the Russian warships that
reached ports in China and French Indochina were disarmed 
and interned for the remainder of the war without incident. 
However, disputes concerning other Russian naval refugees 
demonstrated to the United States the difficulties of 
enforcing the belligerents' respect of Chinese neutrality.
On August 11, the day after the battle, the Russian cruiser 
Ryeshitelni requested internment in the port of Zhefu on the 
Shandong Peninsula, where it proceeded to disarm in the 
presence of other vessels belonging to various nations, 
including the United States. Suddenly, outside the harbor 
loomed two Japanese destroyers whose commander demanded the 
surrender of the Russian vessel. Ignoring protests from the 
American and the other neutral ships, the Japanese ships 
entered the harbor and towed the Russian ship away; 
subsequently, the ship was incorporated into Togo's fleet.30
The next day, two other Russian warships, the Askold 
and the Grosovoi, sought refuge and repairs in Shanghai; 
Japan angrily demanded their expulsion from the Chinese 
port. Though several American destroyers were stationed in 
Shanghai, the American Consul-General there, John Goodnow, 
cabled Washington for advice. Unwilling to commit the 
American navy to the defense of Chinese neutrality, since it 
was now becoming clear that such a policy would prevent the 
use of American vessels elsewhere, Roosevelt ordered the 
chief American naval officer in the vicinity, Admiral Yates 
Stirling, not to interfere in the event of combat between 
Russian and Japanese vessels in Chinese ports. The President 
and acting Secretary of State Alvee Adee also warned Goodnow 
not to uphold the neutrality of Shanghai either alone or in 
conjunction with the other neutral envoys there. Though the
crisis was finally resolved on August 24, when the two 
Russian vessels agreed to disarmament and internment, the 
incident impelled Washington to abandon its earlier advocacy 
of Chinese neutrality.31 Roosevelt thereafter contended 
that the Chinese ports should relinquish their claims to 
neutrality, and become "spheres of hostility to which the 
Russians could no longer run if followed."32 Washington 
thus began to abdicate its avowed role as the guarantor of 
the "Open Door" policy in China, in response to demonstrated 
inability to enforce its terms.
Having virtually abandoned the defense of Chinese 
neutrality, Washington then endeavored to isolate the 
Philippine archipelago through the remaining months of the 
war. Although the Russian fleet at Port Arthur was no longer 
a subject of concern after August, American leaders learned 
in October of 1904 that Russia's Baltic Fleet, under the 
command of Admiral Zinovy Rozhdestvenski, had left the port 
of Reval (in present-day Estonia) and embarked on the 
arduous 18,000-mile voyage to the area of operations. 33 As 
Rozhdestvenski's ships crawled eastward, advance Japanese 
naval patrols steamed to Singapore, causing American naval 
officials to believe that the engagement between the 
opposing fleets, should it occur, would take place somewhere 
in the southern Pacific. Accordingly, Admiral Stirling was 
ordered in January of 1905 to consolidate all of his naval
19
forces in the Philippines in order to prevent belligerent 
intrusion into the islands' harbors.34
The anticipation ended on May 27, 1905. On that day, in 
the greatest naval battle since Trafalgar a century earlier, 
Togo crushed Rozhdestvenski's exhausted fleet in the Straits 
of Tsushima, which divide Japan from Korea. As the slow 
Russian vessels advanced in single file, Togo's fleet 
"crossed the T" and inflicted a devastating fire upon them. 
All through the following night, Japanese torpedo boats 
harried the surviving enemy ships, and, on the morning of 
May 28, the few Russian ships still afloat in the area 
surrendered. Only three vessels from the Baltic Fleet 
successfully reached Vladivostok; other refugees fled for 
Shanghai and other neutral ports. The losses sustained by 
the two navies attested to the lopsided nature of the 
Japanese victory. Rozhdestvenski, seriously wounded in the 
fight and captured at its conclusion, lost sixteen of his 
twenty-nine battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, including 
his flagship, the Suvarov, During the battle and its 
aftermath, over 13,500 Russian sailors were either killed, 
taken prisoner, or interned in neutral countries. In 
striking contrast, Togo's navy had lost only three torpedo 
boats; though several other Japanese ships were badly 
damaged, they were still operational. Moreover, the Japanese 
incurred only 700 casualties during the engagement.35
20
Thereafter, the Japanese navy wielded uncontested dominance 
of the western Pacific Ocean. A distinguished naval 
historian, Roosevelt sent an ebullient note of 
congratulation to Kaneko on May 31, asserting that "neither 
Trafalgar nor the defeat of the Spanish Armada was as 
complete - as overwhelming" as the Japanese triumph.36
The aftermath of Tsushima presented the American navy 
with a challenge to the preservation of neutrality in the 
Philippines. In early June of 1905, three Russian cruisers 
that had survived the battle (the Oleg, the Aurora, and the 
Zhemchug) limped into Manila Bay. Upon arrival, the Russian 
commander, Admiral Oscar Enquist, pleaded for supplies and 
repairs for his stricken ships. Roosevelt himself refused 
this request. Instead, he demanded that the Russian vessels 
either leave Manila Bay within twenty-four hours or submit 
to internment. The drained Russians chose the latter 
option.37
Thus, the naval war between Russia and Japan 
demonstrated the limits of the American ability to insulate 
Chinese ports from the impact of combat in the surrounding 
waters, which was an integral aspect of the "Open Door" 
policy. Thereafter, Washington was aware that a determined 
belligerent wielding local naval superiority in that region 
could easily thwart American policy objectives. As 
illustrated by the seizure of the Ryeshitelni, vessels of
21
the Japanese navy could range virtually at will in Chinese 
harbors, with American and European agents having little 
besides words with which to counter them. Moreover, American 
naval power could not shield the Philippine archipelago from 
the effects of foreign conflict in that vicinity. Three of 
the Russian naval vessels that had survived Tsushima 
successfully penetrated Manila Bay, despite American efforts 
to isolate the islands from belligerent activity. The 
convalescence of the Russian cruisers there represented a 
substantial retreat from the original parameters which 
Roosevelt had delineated in his proclamation of American 
neutrality at the outbreak of hostilities. The sudden, 
unchallenged predominance of the formidable Japanese navy in 
the western Pacific after its destruction of the Baltic
i ,
Fleet further emphasized the tenuousness of the American 
position in that region. After his jubilation at the 
climactic outcome of the naval war subsided, Roosevelt soon 
perceived its implications. Sobered by this realization, he 
expressed his concern in a confidential letter to Senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge on June 5, 1905:
While we had thought that the probabilities 
favored Togo's victory, most of us, and certainly 
I, had thought that the fight would be close, that 
there was some chance for the Russians, and that 
at least there would be a terrible battering of the 
Japanese ships. No one anticipated that it would be 
a rout and a slaughter rather than a fight; that the
22
Russian fleet would be absolutely destroyed while 
the Japanese fleet was left practically uninjured.38
For the first time in history, a major naval power had its 
entire arsenal concentrated in the western Pacific, thus 
posing a new challenge to the comparatively dispersed 
Western navies.
Japan's armies proved equally effective in 
demonstrating their primacy in East Asia, and the 
corresponding frailty of Washington's "Open Door" policy in 
China. Roosevelt was already well aware of the prowess of 
the Japanese soldier. During the international suppression 
of the Boxer Rebellion, he had received letters from 
American soldiers in China which suggested that the Japanese 
soldiers outclassed their Western comrades; impressed, 
Roosevelt had remarked to his German friend Hermann Speck 
von Sternburg, "What natural fighters they are!"39 In 1904, 
with the inefficiency of the American army in the war with 
Spain still a recent memory, the President quickly perceived 
the war between Japan -and -Russia ~as-an~~opportunity to 
witness the methods of the Japanese land forces and learn 
from them. For this task, he enlisted the services of 
several journalists and officers in the American army.
He encountered little difficulty in finding volunteers. 
War correspondents such as Frederick Palmer, J. Martin
Miller, and Richard Harding Davis eagerly embraced the 
opportunity to capture the impending drama in words.40 From 
among its officers, the United States Army sent such 
contemporary and future luminaries as General Arthur 
MacArthur and his twenty-four-year-old son Douglas, Captain 
Peyton C. March, and Captain John J. Pershing to observe the 
Eastern conflagration.41 Though American observers 
accompanied the Russian as well as the Japanese armies, 
Washington's attention was riveted upon the latter.
Between mid-February and early May of 1904, the world's 
attention devolved upon General Kuroki Tametomo's army as it 
marched northward along the muddy roads of Korea toward 
Manchuria, fending off sporadic attacks by Cossack cavalry 
raiders en route.42 Arrayed on the northern bank of the 
Yalu River against this advancing column was a smaller 
Russian army under the command of Lieutenant-General Mikhail 
Zasulich. Although the overall commander of Russian land 
forces in Manchuria, General Alexei Kuropatkin, had ordered 
Zasulich to withdraw if outnumbered, Zasulich, "scoffing at 
Kuropatkin's suggestion that the Japanese were to be 
regarded as the equals of European troops," chose to give 
battle instead.43 This decision proved to be a foolish 
mistake. The two armies clashed on April 25; after several 
days of pounding the Russian position on the northern bank 
with artillery, the Japanese army emerged victorious on May
24
l.44 Although the battle of the Yalu River was a minor 
engagement in comparison with the epic struggles that lay 
ahead, it had been the proving ground for Japan. Thereafter, 
11 it was no longer a collection of tiny islands inhabited by 
curious little people, but a new and serious factor in 
international affairs."45
The significance of this engagement was not lost upon 
contemporary Western citizens. Kuroki's victory persuaded 
American and British bankers that the Japanese war effort 
was a sound investment; for the duration of the conflict, 
they willingly extended to Tokyo loans of almost 
unprecedented magnitude.46 The New York Times' report of 
the battle, which appeared on May 3, offered a prescient 
comment on its long-term ramifications:
Although the defeat of a fraction of the Tsar's huge 
army is not necessarily decisive, the consequences of 
this battle promise to be far-reaching. Rivals and 
subject races alike have waited for Russia to make 
good her boasts and affirm the predominance to 
which she both aspires and pretends. She has given 
battle on ground of her own choosing, and has been
 badly- beaten by a despised and Oriental army. The
echoes of the battle will reverberate afar, and 
distant is the day when the story will weary in 
the telling among the races of the unforgiving East.47
Two weeks after the triumph on the Yalu, Captain Peyton
C. March presented his credentials to Kuroki as the Japanese 
hero led his forces through Manchuria. Both Palmer and March
accompanied the Japanese First Army on its trek until the 
following November.48 March was immediately struck at the 
ease with which Japanese spies obtained information about 
Russian movements. As he later reported, 11 (the Japanese 
soldiers') familiarity with the Chinese language; the 
readiness with which a Japanese can simulate a Chinese; and 
the utter impossibility of the big, blue-eyed, fair Russian 
successfully accomplishing such a feat, gives to the 
Japanese a great advantage while operating in this 
country."49 Reinforcements from western Russia (who were 
widely regarded as qualitatively superior to their Siberian 
comrades) failed to blunt the Japanese thrust that summer.50
Meanwhile, three more Japanese armies landed in 
Manchuria, attracting the attention of other American 
observers. Similar to the early experiences of Kuroki's 
vanguard, these armies, operating independently, initially 
encountered relatively small bodies of Russian soldiers. In 
May, the Japanese Second Army, under the command of General 
Oku Yasukata, appeared on the Liaodong Peninsula to the 
north of Port Arthur, where it trounced a Russian regiment 
led by Colonel Nikolai Tretyakov at Nanshan (May 25-26).51 
After thus isolating Port Arthur from the main Russian 
forces in Manchuria, Oku turned northward, while General 
Nogi Maresuke's Third Army prepared to batter the surrounded 
harbor into submission.52 Lastly, advancing between the
armies under Kuroki and Oku was the Fourth Army, led by 
General Nozu Michitsura.53
Although engagements of limited scale continued to 
characterize the land war into the early summer of 1904, the 
Japanese campaign gradually obtained a guise of much vaster 
proportions as three of the armies converged upon the 
Manchurian city of Liaoyang, the administrative center of 
Kuropatkin's forces. In order to coordinate the Japanese 
plunges into Manchuria, Field-Marshal Oyama Iwao assumed the 
task of their overall direction in early July of 1904. He 
left Japan with his chief of staff, the brilliant 
Lieutenant-General Kodama Gentaro, to join Oku's army on 
July 6.54 As the three Japanese armies became welded into a 
single unit, several Western observers began to believe that 
the impending battle would decide the outcome of the war. 
General Sir Ian Hamilton, Britain's military observer with 
Kuroki's army, remarked in his wartime diary on August 23, 
"What a splendid thing to be alive, and to be taking part in 
the great final trek of the Manchurian War!"55______________
Though the battle which erupted south of Liaoyang three 
days later did not occur at the end of the "final trek" of 
Oyama's troops, it was the first full-scale land engagement 
of the war. Witnessing this struggle raging along a ten-mile 
front, Palmer declared, "The great conflict (has) begun!" 
and added, "the havoc of five hundred guns was outlined as
clearly as the battle panorama of a Gettysburg or a 
Sedan."56 Outnumbered by the Russians (125,000 Japanese 
soldiers against 158,000 Russian troops), the Japanese 
compensated for their numerical inferiority with bold 
tactics and superior organization. As a result, Oyama 
eventually forced Kuropatkin to retreat northward on the 
morning of September 4. Nevertheless, the Japanese soldiers, 
their supply of ammunition depleted, could not contest the 
Russian retreat. Though he had successfully outmaneuvered 
Kuropatkin, Oyama nevertheless paid a high price for victory 
at Liaoyang. Japanese casualties greatly outweighed the 
Russian losses.57 For the remainder of September, the 
Japanese cautiously advanced northward as their adversaries 
gave ground. An attempted Russian counteroffensive in 
October proved to be a costly failure.58
Meanwhile, to the south, Nogi's Third Army struggled to 
reduce the Russian garrison in Port Arthur. Nogi, who had 
easily captured Port Arthur in November of 1894 during the 
war with China,59 initially expected a similarly rapid 
Russian collapse. He was gravely mistaken. Despite 
debilitating sickness, constant bickering among the Russian 
garrison's commanders, and sporadic bombardments from Togo's 
navy, the Russian forces there heroically resisted Japanese 
pressure. The efficient, hard-working commander of the 
fortress, Lieutenant-General Constantine Smirnov, endeavored
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to improve long-neglected defensive positions in the hills 
surrounding the harbor. Furthermore, after Port Arthur's 
fleet returned for the last time following the battle of the 
Yellow Sea on August 10, 1904, the garrison mounted the 
ships' guns on the hills in an effort to counter the threat 
posed by Nogi's army.60
Undaunted, the Japanese general attempted to overwhelm 
the Russians with a frontal assault on August 19; by August 
23, the Russians had repulsed the enemy attackers, 
inflicting thousands of casualties.61 In late September, 
Nogi's forces made unsuccessful and costly efforts to 
capture forts along the Russian line of defense, and also 
the strategic heights which afforded a commanding view of 
the harbor. Finally, armed with eleven-inch Krupp siege guns 
imported from Germany, the Japanese army pounded the 
garrison and the town incessantly, driving many Russian 
defenders into underground bunkers.62 This barrage 
gradually eroded the garrison's capacity to resist. At the 
end of November, Nogi tried to capture the heights again; 
though thousands of Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded 
in this attack, the crucial promontories were nevertheless 
in Japanese possession by December 5. Soon, Japanese 
artillery guns appeared on their summits, from which they 
dealt the final blows to Port Arthur's fleet and garrison. 
Ultimately, the garrison's chief commander,
Lieutenant-General Anatole Stoessel, was compelled to 
surrender to Nogi on January 2, 1905.63
The fall of Port Arthur sparked varying reactions 
across the United States. Japanese students at Yale 
University, after overcoming initial disbelief, ecstatically 
embraced one another in their dormitory's halls.64 Articles 
in the New York Times on January 3 captured the drama of the 
long siege, describing the fortress as a "veritable hell" in 
which the isolated Russian defenders eventually had little 
more than bayonets with which to fend off the Japanese 
onslaughts.65 Another article reflected briefly upon the 
then unknown human cost which Japan had paid for the capture 
of Port Arthur:
Japanese energy has prevailed (over Russian 
stubbornness), but at what a terrible price the 
world is as yet in ignorance. All that is 
known is that the cost in human life was 
fearful, and that in modern times, no 
military commander had previously dared 
sacrifice men as Nogi sacrificed them in the 
(Liaodong) Peninsula.66
Lastly, declaring that "the Gibraltar of the Far East is in 
a heap of ruins,"67 a Times editorialist demanded an 
immediate peaceful solution to the conflict between Russia 
and Japan, even if international intervention should prove 
necessary to separate the combatants:
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Why should not the impartial world now at last 
intervene to stop the further effusion of blood, 
and to save brave but unready Russia the 
consequence of the defeats arising from her own 
unpreparedness to execute the bold programme 
she has framed? Is it not clear that Japan has 
won the war?...How can France possibly desire 
that her ally (Russia) shall weaken itself still 
further in the prosecution of a war which can have 
no triumphs, and which only stupid stubbornness 
can refuse to accept as already decided?68
Furthermore, the editorial prophetically warned, 
"...there are already ominous signs of what the prolongation 
of the war may mean to Russia in the internal disturbance of 
her empire, of how soon she may have to reckon with an enemy 
of the autocracy yet more formidable than the Japanese."69 
Less than three weeks later, on Sunday, January 22, 1905, 
guards in front of Tsar Nicholas II's Winter Palace in St. 
Petersburg fired into a large crowd of the "little father's" 
subjects that had gathered to appeal to the Tsar to 
undertake sorely needed reforms. Several hundred were either 
killed or wounded.70 The "Bloody Sunday"^ massacre, ini part__ 
a product of the growing war-weariness afflicting the 
country, ignited unprecedented revolutionary outbursts 
against the autocratic government.
Despite such clamoring for peace, the war in Manchuria 
rapidly approached its climax as Nogi's army, having finally 
conquered Port Arthur, rushed northward to join the other
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three Japanese armies in support of Oyama's final attempt to 
bring the Japanese campaign to a decisive conclusion. The 
ensuing battle for the Manchurian capital of Mukden, 
extending along a front line eighty miles in length and 
pitting nearly 500,000 Russian and Japanese troops against 
one another, was the largest engagement in human history 
prior to the First World War. Once again, Oyama sought to 
outflank his adversary in the clash which began on February 
21, 1905. Before the Japanese forces could sever the Russian 
line of retreat, however, Kuropatkin withdrew his remaining 
troops northward on March 9. The Russian flight to Harbin, 
forty miles distant, continued through the next day. The 
final major clash of the war in Manchuria had cost both 
armies dearly; Kuropatkin had lost one third of his 
manpower, and Oyama had sacrificed one fourth of his forces 
in his last, unsuccessful attempt to eliminate the Russian 
army.71 Pending the influx from the west of Russian 
reinforcements sufficient to alter the strategic balance in
Manchuria, Oyama wielded supremacy in the area of___________
hostilities. Disappointed, the Tsar replaced Kuropatkin with 
Lieutenant-General Nicholas Linievich on March 12.72 
Roosevelt enthusiastically received the news of this epic 
conclusion of the land war. In an effusive note to Kaneko, 
the President exclaimed, "Wonderful! Wonderful! Unparalleled 
in the world. A great victory! The way things look,
everything is moving forward at great speed. Hurrah for 
Japan 11173
Unfortunately for Japan, however, Oyama's forces 
emerged from the great battle exhausted and unable to 
advance further. To make matters worse, the ability of the 
home islands to sustain the rigors of wartime production was 
rapidly waning; unlike the Russians, the Japanese lacked the 
means to replace the losses in personnel and materiel that 
were incurred in the struggle for Mukden.74 Tokyo's secrecy 
concealed this tenuous situation from foreign knowledge. As 
a result, many Western leaders mistakenly believed that the 
war in Manchuria had ended decisively in Japan's favor, and 
that Oyama's forces were poised for further conquest. In his 
letter to Senator Lodge on June 5, 1905, Roosevelt predicted 
that "in a few months, more or less - certainly in a year or 
so - the Japanese will take every Russian army or fortress 
on the Pacific Slope, and will practically drive Russia east 
of Lake Baikal."75
Further underscoring Japan's growing dominance in East 
Asia was the covert use of Chinese collaborators by the 
Japanese armies in Manchuria, in violation of the Chinese 
neutrality which the United States had initially attempted 
to uphold. Though the Qing government in Beijing declared 
its neutrality at the outset of hostilities, the 
independent-minded Yuan Shikai, then the chief administrator
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of northeastern China, secretly aided the Japanese in 
various ways, in the hopes that they would champion China's 
nationhood at war's end. Yuan established an elaborate 
espionage network in which Chinese agents infiltrated 
Russian bases in Manchuria, thus often obtaining valuable 
military information which soon became known to Japanese 
officers. He also supplied the Japanese troops with warm 
clothing and blankets during the cold winter of 1904-05; in 
contrast, the Russian soldiers had scant protection from the 
elements. Though Russian statesmen soon suspected Chinese 
collusion with Japan, and issued complaints to Washington, 
the United States could do little to redress this problem, 
except seek assurances of Chinese neutrality from Beijing, 
whose leaders remained unaware of Yuan's covert 
activities.76
The almost unbroken series of Japanese victories in 
Korea and Manchuria gradually culminated in a crescendo. 
Though the invading Japanese armies initially encountered 
much smaller groups of Russian soldiers, reflecting Russia's 
early underestimation of its foe, the latter stages of the 
land campaign witnessed titanic engagements as the advancing 
Japanese armies united and confronted the entire Russian 
force in Manchuria. Although the Japanese armies ultimately 
failed to annihilate their Russian adversaries (in contrast 
to Togo's final naval victory), their impressive, albeit
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costly, triumphs wrought a sobering effect upon American 
leaders, who quickly realized that Japan potentially 
threatened the weakly defended claims of the United States 
in East Asia with strength on land as well as at sea.
Japan's stunning victories inspired American 
comparisons between Japanese military leaders and 
illustrious Western men of arms. In the estimation of at 
least one American newspaper in 1905, the Japanese army and 
navy merited comparison with the European models which they 
had originally sought to emulate. Reporting on Oyama's 
triumph at Mukden in the New York Times on March 12, 1905, 
the American military analyst Captain William G. Haan 
likened the Japanese commander to Count Helmuth von Moltke, 
the Chief of the formidable Prussian General Staff during 
Otto von Bismarck's wars for German unification.77 
Similarly, after Togo smashed the Baltic Fleet at Tsushima, 
the Times lauded him as "Japan's (Horatio) Nelson," the 
British naval hero of the Napoleonic Wars.78
Though he shared this admiration for Japan, Roosevelt 
harbored apprehensions that military success against Russia 
would infect Japan with a belligerent attitude that would 
destroy the international friendships that the leaders in 
Tokyo had striven to cultivate over the previous decades. As 
early as June of 1904, the President, conferring with Kaneko 
and Takahira Kogoro (Japan's ambassador to the United
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States), informed them of his belief that "their chief 
danger was lest Japan might get the xbig head' and enter 
into a general career of insolence and aggression; that such 
a career would undoubtedly be temporarily very unpleasant to 
the rest of the world, but that it would in the end be still 
more unpleasant for Japan."79 Such misgivings were likely 
magnified by reports indicating the intense patriotism and 
dedication to duty among Japanese soldiers, which cast a 
potentially menacing aspect upon their victories. In his 
memoir Human Bullets, a postwar best-seller in Japan, 
Lieutenant Sakurai Tadayoshi, a participant in the siege of 
Port Arthur, captured in words the ethos of the Japanese 
soldiers
When I offered my last prayers - the last, I then 
believed they were - before the family shrine of my 
ancestors (at the outset of the war), I felt a thrill 
going all through me, as if they were giving me a 
solemn injunction, saying, "Thou art not thy own.
For His Majesty's sake, thou shalt go to save the 
nation from calamity, ready to bear even the crushing 
of thy bones, and the tearing of thy flesh. Disgrace 
not thy ancestors by an act of cowardice.1,80
Furthermore, in retrospective response to a note written by 
an astonished Russian officer which declared, "The Japanese 
army knows how to march, but not how to retreat,"81 Sakurai 
retorted,
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"Back-roving" was ridiculed by the old warriors of 
Japan - our modern fighters also despise the idea 
of retreating. It may be a mistake, but "to show 
one's back to the enemy" has always been 
considered the greatest disgrace a samurai could 
bring upon himself. This idea is the central 
military principle of the people of Japan. This 
note of the Russian general is good testimony 
to the spirit pervading our ranks, "determined 
to the death" and to fight on with strenuous 
perseverance. Every time we fought, we won, 
because we did not believe in retreating.82
American characterizations of the Japanese soldier 
corroborated Sakurai's sweeping prose. Accompanying his 
father, the young Douglas MacArthur encountered the 
personnel of Japan's army for the first time in the autumn 
of 1904. During his visit, this future opponent of the armed 
might of Japan met the chief Japanese wartime commanders, 
whom he described years later as "grim, taciturn, aloof men 
of iron character and unshakeable purpose."83 Moreover, 
MacArthur recalled, "(the Japanese soldier's) almost 
fanatical belief in and reverence for his Emperor impressed 
me indelibly."84 Lieutenant-Colonel Edward J. McClernand, 
who observed the Japanese soldiers in Manchuria- after they 
won the battle of Mukden, later referred to the Japanese 
army as a "military machine"85 whose component parts were 
paragons of "intelligence, patriotism, abstemiousness, (and) 
obedience to, and inborn respect for, legally constituted 
authority."86 Further, Lloyd Griscom, the American
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ambassador to Japan, later asserted that "the Japanese were 
probably the greatest marchers in the world," noting that 
"men who had spent their lives toiling in the fields on a 
diet of rice found it no hardship to plod along all day with 
heavy packs on their backs."87 The formidable army that 
emerged from such descriptions contrasted alarmingly with 
its contemporary American counterpart.
Understandably, military success against Russia wrought 
a profound change in Japan's national self-image. As 
historian Akira Iriye has pointed out, "The Japanese, who 
for so many years had been accustomed to deferring to 
everything Western and feeling inferior to white people, now 
realized that they were equal to any race, any nation in the 
world. They were finding through experience that men were 
all equal, that their racial differences were immaterial, 
and what counted was their power, intelligence, and 
morality."88 Former Foreign Minister Okuma Shigenobu 
captured this new national confidence in a wartime speech: 
"The war, the Japanese feel, proves that there is nothing 
that Westerners do which Asians cannot do, or that there is 
nothing Westerners try that Asians cannot also try."89 This 
awareness of parity with the Western nations fueled an 
expansionistic impulse which carried a strong national sense 
of mission in East Asia. The first issue of the 
nationalistic magazine Katsudo no Nihon (Active Japan)
sounded the charge in May of 1904 with proclamations of 
"Japan's inevitable expansion.1,90 Subsequent issues 
articulated the global vision of Japanese expansionists. In 
March of 1905, Ozaki Yukio, the mayor of Tokyo, wrote, "Now 
that Japan has achieved world-power status, we must stop 
being content with crouching in a small corner of the earth. 
We must broaden our vision and venture out to all parts of 
the world - Africa, South America, North America, everywhere 
in east and west - in order to make the whole universe our 
sphere of action."91 Simultaneously, these spokesmen for 
the new Japan expounded upon their nation's duty to lead the 
rest of Asia on the road to modernity. Yano Ryukei, author 
of Sekai ni okeru Nihon no shorai (Japan's Future in the 
World), published in February of 1905, argued that Japan 
should acquire a position of influence in East Asia 
analogous to that of the United States in the Western 
Hemisphere and that of Britain in Africa and Australia.92
As hostilities with Russia drew to a close, these 
Japanese nationalists did not foresee future animosity 
toward the United States, despite its growing position in 
East Asia and its own sense of mission there. Though they 
acknowledged that the possibility of Japanese-American 
commercial rivalry in Asia and the Pacific loomed on the 
horizon, they confidently predicted a cooperation between 
the two nations based upon a shared commitment to "peaceful
progress" in the world arena.93 The American role in the 
restoration of peace between Japan and Russia and in postwar 
Asia would undermine this optimistic forecast.
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CHAPTER II:
THEODORE ROOSEVELT "ACTS UPON HIS OWN INITIATIVE":
BRINGING THE BELLIGERENTS TO THE PEACE TABLE, 1905
As the Russo-Japanese struggle raged, Roosevelt 
channeled his characteristic boldness into promoting his 
vision of international equilibrium in Europe and Asia. In 
the words of historian Howard K. Beale, the President 
"dreamed of...a world in which the imperial powers would 
live at peace with one another" through mutual recognition 
of territorial spheres of influence. Jealously guarding 
their domains against foreign penetration, the imperial 
powers would mutually check their expansionist 
tendencies. This understanding among the "civilized" nations 
of the world would enable them to focus upon the containment 
and tutelage of the "backward" peoples under their 
jurisdiction.1 In this context, Roosevelt sought to commit 
the United States to redressing imbalances which threatened 
the stability of the world arena. Conversing with the German 
statesman Hermann von Eckardstein, he asserted that "in 
fact, we (Americans) are becoming, owing to our strength and 
geographical situation, more and more the balance of power 
of the whole globe."2
In 1905, Roosevelt seized two opportunities to actuate 
his conception of America's proper role upon the 
international stage. On March 31 of that year, Kaiser 
Wilhelm II delivered an incendiary speech in Tangier in 
French Morocco, in which he denied the existence of French 
sovereignty over the North African nation. This gesture, an
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attempt by the German monarch to arrest the extension of 
French power abroad and to test the strength of the 
embryonic Anglo-French Entente, prompted Roosevelt to 
persuade Berlin to submit the Moroccan question to 
international arbitration. After several delays, a 
conference was finally convened in Algeciras, Spain, in 
January of 1906. Ultimately, acting on Roosevelt's advice, 
Germany acknowledged French control of Morocco, in return 
for a French promise to open its colony to international 
commerce. The outcome of the Algeciras Conference restored a 
veneer of stability among the involved European nations, 
although the episode reinforced Anglo-French ties against 
Germany.3
The war between Russia and Japan provided the second 
occasion for Roosevelt to realize his country's potential as 
a guardian of international equilibrium. From the outset of 
hostilities, Roosevelt, his pro-Japanese sympathies 
notwithstanding, privately wished for the continued presence 
of Russia in East Asia to serve as a counterweight against 
Japanese expansionism. He perceived that Japanese domination 
of the region could prove as detrimental to American "Open 
Door" policy objectives as had the Russian domination. As 
early as March 19, 1904, he expressed in a letter to his 
friend Cecil Arthur Spring Rice (then the secretary to the 
British delegation in St. Petersburg) a hopeful supposition
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that "the two powers will fight until both are fairly well 
exhausted, and that then peace will come on terms which will 
not mean the creation of either a yellow peril or a Slav 
peril.”4 The astonishing pace of Japanese arms through the 
succeeding months gradually convinced the President that a 
rapid cessation of the war was necessary to preserve Russian 
influence in the contested region. Writing to Whitelaw Reid, 
the American ambassador to Britain, on June 5, 19 05, 
Roosevelt admitted that he "should be sorry to see Russia 
driven out of East Asia,” and averred that "driven out she 
will surely be if the war goes on.”5 In sum, he stated to 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge on June 16, 1905, "It is best that 
(Russia) should be left face to face with Japan so that each 
may have a moderative action on the other."6
Equally important to the President was the prevention 
of another concerted European interference with the eventual 
peace settlement, akin to that which had compelled Japan to 
dilute its terms of peace with China in 1895. A similar
multilateral intervention between Japan and Russia __________
threatened not only another denial of the fruits of victory 
to Japan, but also a renewed Western dissection of China. By 
1905, Roosevelt believed, the United States had finally 
acquired a position in East Asia sufficient to prevent such 
a repetition. Soon after the Russo-Japanese War erupted, 
Roosevelt warned Paris and Berlin "in the most polite and
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discreet fashion" that, in the event of a second European 
collusion against Japan, the United States would "promptly 
side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary 
on her behalf."7 Japan's victories steeled his resolve to 
support Japan against any possible European intrusion. In 
early January of 1905, soon after the fall of Port Arthur, 
Secretary of State John Hay noted in his diary that 
Roosevelt "was quite firm in his view that we cannot permit 
Japan to be robbed a second time of the fruits of her 
victory."8
At an early stage in the war, the President's specific 
notions of what constituted Japan's legitimate fruits of 
victory had already begun to crystallize. On June 11, 1904, 
in conversation with Takahira and Kaneko, Roosevelt opined 
that Korea and Port Arthur belonged under Japanese hegemony. 
Though he favored the restoration of Manchuria to China, he 
was convinced that the moribund Qing government would 
require Japanese advisors to govern the area efficiently. 
Lastly, the President championed a Japanese equivalent o f _ 
the Monroe Doctrine, in which Japanese influence in the 
Yellow Sea would mirror American influence in the Caribbean 
Sea. He then hastened to add that he was merely stating his 
personal views, and not speaking as the President of the 
United States.9
On February 6, 1905, Roosevelt communicated these ideas
in a note to the new American ambassador to Russia, George 
von Lengerke Meyer: "Japan ought to have a protectorate over 
Korea (which has shown its utter inability to stand by 
itself), and ought to succeed to Russia's right in and 
around Port Arthur, while I should hope to see Manchuria 
restored to China.”10 When Collier's reporter Richard Barry 
intimated to Roosevelt on February 21 that European 
intervention might once again threaten Japan's claim to Port 
Arthur, the President boomed, "Retain Port Arthur! If in no 
other way, I would make (Japan) hold Port Arthur! She has 
won it, and it is hers, never to be surrendered again. Japan 
must hold Port Arthur and she must hold Korea. These two 
points are already settled."11 Early the next month, Barry, 
on Roosevelt's instructions, relayed this statement across 
the Pacific to the journalist George Kennan, a confidant of 
the President who had close ties with Japanese leaders. He 
in turn reported Roosevelt's words verbatim to Prime 
Minister Katsura Taro.12
At this time, Japan's leaders were still striving to _. 
delineate their terms of peace. Cognizance of Russia's vast 
material resources, and of Japan's comparative weakness, had 
made most of them painfully aware of Japan's inability to 
wrest more than modest terms from its adversary even before 
the commencement of hostilities. Through the early months of 
1905, reports of General Oyama's failure to crush the
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Russian army in Manchuria confirmed this sobering reality.
As early as August of 1904, Prime Minister Katsura's initial 
enumeration of Japan's war aims reflected this quest for 
moderation. He held that the indispensable prerequisites for 
a durable peace between Russia and Japan were Russian 
recognition of Japan's "freedom of action" in Korea, cession 
of the Liaodong Peninsula and Port Arthur to Japan, and the
removal of Russian troops from Manchuria. Katsura then
listed as optional stipulations the transfer of Sakhalin 
Island (which Russia had taken from Japan in 1875) back to
Japan, the payment to Japan of a war indemnity, and the
granting to Japan of full fishing privileges along the 
Siberian coast.13
Others in Tokyo did not share the Prime Minister's 
advocacy of limited demands, noting the tremendous financial 
and military burdens which Japan had borne in a war of 
self-defense provoked by Russian expansionism. In the same 
month that Katsura drafted his proposed terms, Foreign 
Minister Komura Jutaro presented his own set of objectives.. 
At the top of his list was the call for an indemnity to 
reimburse Japan for its wartime expenses, and elsewhere 
appeared the demand for Sakhalin.14 Although Katsura's 
comparatively restrained definition of war objectives 
prevailed at this early phase of the conflict, Komura 
privately clung to his agenda.
The following January, London successfully obtained 
from Tokyo a comprehensive statement of Japanese war aims. 
Soon after the fall of Port Arthur, British Foreign Minister 
Lord Henry Lansdowne instructed his ambassador to Japan, Sir 
Claude MacDonald, to request an enumeration of peace terms 
from Komura, in the hopes of expediting negotiations between 
the belligerents. On January 25, 1905, the Japanese Foreign 
Minister asserted to MacDonald that Tokyo anticipated 
demanding three "inflexibly required" conditions: cession of 
Port Arthur and adjacent territory, restoration of the 
remainder of Manchuria to China, with Japanese control of 
the railway linking Port Arthur and Harbin, and 
acknowledgment of Japanese suzerainty over Korea. In 
addition, Komura indicated that an indemnity and other 
issues would be discussed with the Russians. After MacDonald 
commented that the indemnity question could present 
difficulties, Komura retorted that Russia might choose to 
pay a small indemnity at that time, instead of a larger one 
later (against Japan's mounting wartime debts). Komura 
concluded by proclaiming his government's insistence that 
St. Petersburg initiate the quest for peace. Upon receiving 
this information, Lansdowne confidentially sent it to 
Washington, adding a comment that British leaders did not 
deem the Japanese terms exhorbitant.15
Roosevelt reacted to this official statement of Japan's
peace proposals with uncharacteristic doubt. Despite the 
sanguine remarks about Japan's prospects which he had 
expressed to Kaneko and Takahira the previous June, the 
President did not believe that Japan would gain all of 
Komura's terms. He told Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, the 
British ambassador to Washington, that Tokyo was demanding 
more than its armed forces had been able to conquer. To 
compel Russian submission to the terms, he asserted, the 
Japanese armies would first have to capture Harbin.16 The 
great (albeit inconclusive) armed triumph at Mukden 
seemingly emboldened Japan's Foreign Minister. On March 31, 
1905, Takahira announced to Roosevelt Komura's assertion 
that Japan could continue fighting for another year, and 
that the conflict would persist until the Tsar himself sued 
for peace. The Japanese ambassador then discussed Komura's 
belief that international precedents entitled Japan to an 
indemnity, and hinted that the Foreign Minister was also 
considering the cession of Sakhalin as part of Japan's price 
for peace.17
The President reacted ambivalently to these anticipated 
demands for money and territory. Although he informed 
Takahira of his personal hope that Japan would be able to 
receive financial compensation from Russia for wartime 
expenses, Roosevelt perhaps recalled that Japan had invested 
its 1895 indemnity from China in large-scale rearmament. If
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Japan were to finance a similar program with an indemnity 
extracted from Russia, the island nation could prove a 
serious threat to Roosevelt's vision of the postwar balance 
of power in East Asia and the Pacific region. The President 
warned Takahira of probable Russian inability to pay a large 
indemnity, and suggested that intransigence on this issue 
might damage Japan's hard-won prestige in the world arena. 
Given these factors, Roosevelt advised Takahira against 
seeking an indemnity. Regarding Japanese designs on 
Sakhalin, the President pointed out that the coveted 
territory was a sparsely populated island with little 
intrinsic value, hardly worth the status of a major war 
objective.18
These Japanese demands for payment and territory 
continued to trouble Roosevelt through the next several 
weeks. In May of 1905, he wrote to his friend Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge, stating that Japan should eschew terms that 
would induce Russia to continue fighting, rather than accept 
defeat. Writing to Meyer in the same month, the President 
averred that, if he were a Russian, he would not submit to 
conditions that included an indemnity and cession of 
territory. In conversation with Kaneko in mid-May, Roosevelt 
reiterated his opinion that Japan should abandon any plans 
to demand an indemnity and Sakhalin from Russia. When Kaneko 
cited the precedent occasioned by the French indemnity
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payment and cession of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany after the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, Roosevelt pointed out that, 
in 1871, German forces had occupied Paris. In contrast, 
Japanese forces had not yet occupied Russian territory.19
The President mistakenly feared that these demands 
originated among military leaders intoxicated with their 
armed success against Russia. Unbeknownst to him, Japan's 
strategists had been painfully aware that prolonged 
hostilities would reverse their hard-won gains in Manchuria 
since March of 1905. Although they had achieved an almost 
unbroken series of victories in the land war, they knew that 
Japan lacked the human and material resources to wage a 
protracted war against the largest nation in the world. They 
therefore warned their government that Japan was ill able to 
seek sweeping concessions that would likely steel Russian 
resolve to continue fighting. Contrary to Roosevelt's 
belief, Foreign Minister Komura remained the primary 
agitator for an indemnity and cession of Sakhalin.20
Komura's minority position was reinforced on April 21, 
1905, when the government leaders in Tokyo officially 
determined Japan's peace terms. Three conditions were 
considered "indispensable": freedom of action for Japan in 
Korea, mutual evacuation of Russian and Japanese military 
personnel from Manchuria, and cession to Japan of Port 
Arthur and the railway linking the harbor with Harbin. The
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Foreign Minister's preferred demands for an indemnity and 
the cession of Sakhalin were once again listed as "items not 
absolutely indispensable.1,21
The government concealed these deliberations on peace 
terms, as well as the somber reports from army commanders, 
from the Diet and the Japanese public. Japanese citizens, 
receiving news of the war through the filter of governmental 
censorship, believed by the spring of 1905 that the Russian 
forces in Manchuria were on the verge of collapse, that 
Oyama was poised for further great victories against them,
j
and that Japan could therefore expect generous concessions 
from its adversary. Specifically, they anticipated an 
indemnity by the closing stages of hostilities. Russia had 
instigated war with its occupation of Manchuria and Port 
Arthur and its machinations in Korea. Japan therefore 
deserved reimbursement from Russian coffers for its war of 
self-defense. Precedents established by previous wars in 
East Asia further buttressed Japan's claim for reparations. 
China, defeated in the Opium War (1839-42), the Arrow War 
(1858-60), the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), and the Boxer 
Rebellion (1900-01), had paid large sums to its victorious 
opponents in each case. Having endured high wartime taxes in 
1904-05, the Japanese people feared that failure to gain an 
indemnity from Russia would condemn them to continued 
onerous financial burdens through the immediate postwar
period. Japan's business leaders observed that Japan would 
need monetary compensation in order to repay its wartime 
debts and to underwrite future investments in Korea and 
Manchuria. Without payment from Russia, they predicted, the 
Japanese economy, which had enjoyed wartime prosperity, 
would falter once peace was restored.22 Meanwhile, Japanese 
jingoes formed groups such as the Tairo Doshikai 
(Anti-Russian Comrades' Society), which agitated for 
obtainment of an indemnity, Sakhalin, and Russian holdings 
in Manchuria. These groups also convened mass meetings 
throughout the country to galvanize the Japanese populace 
against a "dishonorable" peace.23 As historian Shumpei 
Okamoto has observed, "In their desperate determination, a 
large segment of the Japanese public grew increasingly 
unrealistic and irrational.1,24
During its deliberations over proposed peace terms, the 
Japanese government also received considerable pressure from 
its military leaders and from France to initiate the 
peacemaking process. Worried by Kaiser Wilhelm II's 
provocations in French Algeria, Paris began in March of 1905 
an attempt to end the Asian war in order to restore the 
Russian counterweight to German ambitions in Europe and 
Africa. In mid-March, seeking to coerce Russia to sue for 
peace, French bankers in St. Petersburg abruptly cancelled 
their plans to extend another war loan to the Russian
government.25 This maneuver prodded Tsar Nicholas II to 
take a tentative step toward negotiation with Japan. On 
March 21, the Russian monarch instructed his ambassador to 
Paris, Alexander Nelidov, to communicate with the Japanese 
through French Foreign Minister Theophile Delcasse. On April 
5, Delcasse informed Japan's ambassador Motono Ichiro of his 
belief that Russia would agree to commence peace 
negotiations, provided that Japan would foreswear designs on 
Russian territory and demands for an indemnity. After Motono 
cabled Tokyo with this information, Komura gave a lukewarm 
response. The Japanese Foreign Minister argued that, despite 
the nearly unbroken series of Russian military defeats, St. 
Petersburg was attempting to dictate the parameters of a 
peace conference.26 In addition, the Japanese government 
remained wary of accepting the good offices of a Russian 
ally, especially when French territories in Africa and Asia 
were then supplying Russia's Baltic Fleet with coal and 
other provisions as it crawled eastward.27 (In mid-April, 
Admiral Rozhdestvenski's ill-fated armada would stagger into 
Camranh Bay in French Indochina.28)
This external pressure to begin the quest for peace 
sparked heated debate among government leaders in Tokyo. At 
a deadlocked conference on April 8, the senior members of 
the Genro advocated initiating the call for negotiations. 
They cautioned that continuation of the war not only would
threaten to reverse the tide of battle in Manchuria, but 
also would exacerbate Japan's foreign debt. In contrast, 
Katsura and Komura adamantly insisted that Russia should be 
the first to request an end to hostilities. They contended 
that Russia would perceive a Japanese overture as a sign of 
weakness. Cognizant that the Baltic Fleet was then inching 
its way toward the war zone, the two ministers also did not 
wish to project abroad the impression that it intimidated 
Japan. After more than a week of dissension, the Genro 
finally overruled Katsura and Komura on April 17. On that 
day, Tokyo decided to send confidential hints to Washington 
to indicate Japan's readiness to open negotiations with 
Russia.29
Japanese plans to turn to the United States to request 
arbitration at an opportune juncture in the war antedated 
the outbreak of hostilities in February of 1904. Europe's 
extensive alliance system, which included both Russia and 
Japan by 1904, would likely prejudice a potential European 
mediator. France's abortive attempt to intercede in April of 
1905 confirmed this belief. Also, memories of the 1895 
Triple Intervention by France, Germany, and Russia on 
China's behalf during the Shimonoseki Conference continued 
to rankle Japan's leaders. The United States, isolated from 
the vagaries of European diplomacy, appeared best suited for 
the role of an impartial arbiter. For this reason, Tokyo had
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dispatched Kaneko to Washington early in the war as a 
special emissary to plead Japan's case to the American 
people, and to cultivate support for Japan among 
American leaders.30
Immediately after electing to request American 
mediation, Tokyo began to send subtle signals to Washington. 
On April 18, Takahira discussed Japan's recent rejection of 
Delcasse's overture with Secretary of War William Howard 
Taft, and asked him to apprise Roosevelt. Taft then sent a 
confidential telegram to the President, stating that 
although Japan had refused the French offer, it "had no 
intention to close the door to friendly offices exerted 
purely for the purpose of bringing the belligerents 
together." Indeed, Japanese leaders judged that "it (was) 
not unlikely that the friendly good offices of some Power 
might be necessary." In reply, Roosevelt accepted the 
Japanese position that "negotiations should be directly 
between Russia and Japan, and should include all the 
possible terms of peace," and added as a proviso his 
assumption that "Japan (was) adhering to her position of 
maintaining the Open Door in Manchuria and restoring it to 
China."31 In a separate, private letter to Taft, Roosevelt 
explained that his endorsement of direct negotiations on all 
terms of peace did not imply his approval of Japan's demands 
for an indemnity or cession of territory. Instead, the
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President remained noncommittal on these points.32
Tokyo readily acceded to Roosevelt's injunction 
regarding Manchuria on April 25. In a message announcing his 
government's agreement with the President, Komura further 
solicited advice from the American leader on the best means 
by which Japan could "pave the way" for negotiations with 
Russia. Simultaneously, Ambassador Lloyd Griscom cabled 
Washington from Tokyo, describing Japan's eagerness for 
peace, and asserting that its leaders sought Roosevelt's 
assistance in effecting a settlement with Russia. Somewhat 
taken aback by these signs of Japanese war-weariness, the 
President informed Taft on April 27 that he was "a good deal 
puzzled" by these reports, but urged Taft to arrange "an 
absolutely frank talk" between Takahira and Count Arthur 
Cassini, the Russian ambassador in Washington.33
Komura immediately balked at this suggestion from the 
President, refusing to open such crucial discussions with "a 
man of Cassini's known character."34 Instead, the Japanese 
Foreign Minister continued to appeal to Roosevelt 
personally. On May 13, 1905, Takahira finally approached him 
with a direct request for assistance from Tokyo. Komura 
asked Roosevelt if he believed the time was ripe for 
commencing peace negotiations, and further inquired whether 
he "would be so kind as to go to the trouble of bringing the 
two nations together for a meeting on his own initiative" if
65
he judged a rapid end to the war to be necessary. The 
Japanese Foreign Minister hastened to add that his nation 
was not seeking the President's advice from a position of 
weakness, asserting that Japan was "in the best possible 
position" financially and militarily.35 In response, 
Roosevelt reminded Takahira of Russia's persistent 
unwillingness to accept defeat, as evidenced by the slow 
approach of its Baltic Fleet, which was then preparing to 
embark from Camranh Bay upon the final leg of its voyage to 
Vladivostok.36 The President counseled Takahira that Russia 
would interpret an overture from Tokyo at that juncture as 
evidence that Admiral Rozhdestvenski's decrepit armada 
intimidated Japan. He concluded by averring that Japan 
should defer further peace initiatives until after its navy 
had dealt with the Russian fleet.37
Exactly two weeks later, on May 27-28, Admiral Togo 
smashed the Baltic Fleet in the Straits of Tsushima. This 
resounding triumph convinced both Tokyo and Washington that 
an opportune moment to commence peace negotiations had at 
last arrived. On May 31, Komura cabled Takahira with 
confidential instructions to request Roosevelt's assistance 
in arranging a conference with Russia. Still anxious to 
conceal from Russian knowledge the fervent Japanese desire 
for peace, Tokyo indicated that the President should invite 
the two belligerents to commence negotiations "directly and
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entirely of his own initiative.11 On the next day, June 1, 
Takahira formally presented this message to Roosevelt.
Though the President willingly accepted this task, he feared 
that Japan's proposed demands for an indemnity and cession 
of territory threatened to sabotage prospects for a 
successful conference. Roosevelt repeated his warning to 
Takahira of probable Russian unwillingness to pay war 
reparations. Tokyo's invocation of the precedent of the 1871 
French indemnity to Germany, he asserted, "might be 
reasonable if the Japanese armies were surrounding Moscow." 
Instead, the President suggested that, if Japan were to 
abandon its financial designs and accept a partition of 
Sakhalin, Russia would agree to ending the war.38
Since the beginning of 1905, Roosevelt himself had been 
striving to persuade Russia to sue for peace before the 
Japanese military onslaught undermined his vision of the 
postwar balance of power in East Asia. As early as December 
of 1904, he had resolved to replace Robert McCormick, the 
American ambassador to St. Petersburg, with the more adept 
George von Lengerke Meyer. Writing to Meyer on December 26, 
he characterized that position as "the most important post 
in the diplomatic service from the standpoint of work to be 
done."39 The fall of Port Arthur and the eruption of 
revolution against the Tsarist regime the following January 
underscored the urgency of preventing further bloodshed in
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Manchuria, and Meyer presented his credentials to Russian 
Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamsdorff in February.40
Meanwhile, Roosevelt prevailed upon Chicago Tribune 
correspondent John Callan O'Laughlin, who had close ties 
with the Russian embassy in Washington, to inform Cassini of 
his conviction that, unless Russia could maintain six 
hundred thousand men in Manchuria and achieve success with 
its Baltic Fleet, it should make peace with Japan. 
Simultaneously, the President gave the same statement to 
Jules Jusserand, the French ambassador to the United States, 
in the hopes that France could influence its Russian ally. 
Neither initiative brought results. Though he strongly 
wished for peace, French Foreign Minister Delcasse declined 
to advise the Russian government, worried that Russia would 
blame France for an unfavorable peace settlement. Rather, 
Delcasse urged Roosevelt to persuade Japan to begin the 
peacemaking process on moderate terms. Upon hearing rumors 
about Japan's possible demands for money and territory, 
Cassini defiantly told O'Laughlin that only a nation with 
two remaining soldiers, and those in retreat, would submit 
to such conditions. Russia still had a massive army in 
Manchuria and the Baltic Fleet. His nation, Cassini 
declared, was not yet beaten.41
The subsequent defeat at Mukden and the suspension of 
wartime loans from French bankers failed to dampen Russian
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resolve. A conference between Roosevelt and Cassini in late 
March revealed that the attitude of the Russian ambassador 
had not changed. When the President attempted to convince 
Cassini that peace served the national interests of both 
Russia and the United States, which did not wish to witness 
the elimination of Russian influence in East Asia, the 
Russian argued that his nation would never pay an indemnity 
or surrender territory to obtain peace. Roosevelt queried 
about the course Russia would take if Vladivostok and Harbin 
were to fall to the Japanese army. In reply, Cassini claimed 
that Japan could ill afford extended operations in 
Manchuria. Unaware at the time of the exhaustion of Oyama's 
forces, Roosevelt shot back that Russian persistence derived 
from a "dangerous delusion.1,42
Meyer fared little better in St. Petersburg. Tsar 
Nicholas II had quickly lost interest in the secret attempt 
to approach Japan through France which he had undertaken in 
late March of 1905. He soon received external encouragement 
to persevere. Alarmed by the revolutionary tensions 
convulsing Russia, German Chancellor Bernhard furst von 
Bulow believed that an unfavorable peace settlement would 
exacerbate the unrest, potentially jeopardizing not only the 
Russian monarchy, but also the other monarchies on the 
European continent. In April of 1905, Bulow sent Wilhelm 
II's brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, to St. Petersburg to
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assure the Tsar that time was on the side of the Russian 
forces in Manchuria. Prince Henry brought with him a report 
from the German General Staff which stated that Sakhalin and 
Vladivostok lay within Japan's reach, but that the Japanese 
advance would eventually ebb in the vast Siberian wasteland, 
where Oyama's armies could only languish at a ruinous cost 
to Japan. As a result, the German assessment concluded,
Japan could not coerce Russia to sue for peace. His resolve 
steeled, Nicholas II then saw the Baltic Fleet as the 
instrument for reversing the tide of war. Triumphantly, 
Prince Henry telegraphed Berlin, "Tsar determined to 
continue war in spite of strong agitation for peace. He pins 
his whole hopes on Rozhdestvenski...Tsar in calm and normal 
spirits." Meyer glumly commented in his diary that there was 
no hope for peace until after an engagement between the 
Japanese navy and the Baltic Fleet.43 An exasperated 
Roosevelt fumed in a May 13 letter to Cecil Arthur Spring 
Rice, "I loathe the Russian system of government...Just at 
the moment, Russia is riding a high horse and will not talk 
peace.1,44
The near annihilation of Rozhdestvenski's armada 
finally undermined the Tsar's determination to prolong 
hostilities. Dazed, he recorded in his diary "the awful news 
about the destruction of almost the entire squadron."
British ambassador Sir Charles Hardinge noted that the naval
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battle had at last awakened the denizens of the Russian 
capital to the horrors of the distant war, since many of the 
officers commanding the doomed vessels had come from the 
nation's elite families. Meyer cabled to Washington his 
impression that the destruction of the Baltic Fleet had 
"really moved" St. Petersburg for the first time in the 
conflict.45
Moreover, by the beginning of June, the Tsar dimly 
recognized the gravity of the domestic turbulence afflicting 
Russia, which had escalated dramatically since the "Bloody 
Sunday" massacre of January 22, 1905. Widespread strikes led 
by workers and students had paralyzed Russian industry and 
closed Russian schools. In May of 1905, political liberals 
had joined forces in a Union of Unions, which vehemently 
demanded the creation of a legislative assembly in the 
Russian government. People of various nationalities subsumed 
under the Russian Empire, such as the Poles, Finns, and 
Ukrainians, clamored for autonomy. The climax of the 
national upheaval occurred in late June of 1905, when 
Russian sailors aboard the battleship Potemkin, stationed at 
the Black Sea port of Odessa, mutinied and sailed for 
Rumania.46 Further defeats in the war with Japan would 
likely exacerbate this unrest.
Observing these tumultuous events from Berlin, a 
dismayed Kaiser Wilhelm II reached a conclusion which
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opposed that of his Chancellor. Conferring with American 
ambassador Charlemagne Tower, the German emperor remarked, 
•'Unless peace is made, they will kill the Tsar,11 and added 
that the assassination of Nicholas II would endanger all 
European monarchs. On June 3, 1905, Wilhelm II urged his 
cousin "Nicky" to seek peace, contending that hopes for a 
reversal of the military tide had died with the Baltic 
Fleet. He strongly advised the Tsar to accept American good 
offices, averring that "if anybody in the world is able to 
influence the Japanese or induce them to be reasonable in 
their proposals, it is President Roosevelt." On the same 
day, the Kaiser sent a message to Roosevelt in which he 
offered his assistance in any efforts the President made on 
behalf of peace.47 Though he appreciated the German 
leader's support, Roosevelt was troubled by Berlin's 
supposition that he would persuade Japan to dilute its peace 
terms. In a private note to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge on 
June 5, the President described the German overture, 
commenting that he "did not desire to be asked to squeeze 
terms out of Japan favorable to Russia."48
Instead, urging the Tsar to accept a peace conference 
on June 5, Roosevelt disavowed any intention of influencing 
Japan: "The President believes it would be better for the 
representatives of the two powers to discuss the whole peace 
question themselves, rather than for any outside power to do
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more than arrange the meeting.” His entreaty also honored 
Japan's fervent desire to maintain the secrecy of its 
initial request for American intercession: "If Russia will 
consent to such a meeting, the President will try to get 
Japan's consent, acting simply on his own initiative."49 To 
Lodge, Roosevelt confided his doubts as to whether this 
message to St. Petersburg would persuade the Russian 
government: "I do not believe there is much chance of this 
bringing about peace, for I suppose the Tsar, who seems in a 
thoroughly Chinese mood, will refuse to do anything. If he 
does, then all I can say is that his blood must be on his 
own head...In any event, I have done what I could to help on 
toward peace."50
Fortunately, Roosevelt's pessimism proved unfounded. On 
June 7, Meyer presented Roosevelt's appeal to the Russian 
monarch at Tsarskoe Selo. During an hour-long audience, the 
American ambassador indicated that he had informed 
Washington that Russia was not desperate for peace at any 
price, and that excessive Japanese demands would rally the 
Russian people behind the Tsar. Also, Meyer reassured 
Nicholas II of the purity of Roosevelt's motives in calling 
for a peace conference. In return, the Tsar informed Meyer 
of his acceptance of the President's invitation, provided 
that Russian approval remain confidential until Japan 
likewise acceded. Nicholas II then added that Meyer had
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arrived at "a psychological moment," in which the Russian 
ruler realized that Russian land, particularly Sakhalin, lay 
vulnerable to further Japanese advances which could occur at 
any time.51
On the evening of June 7, Roosevelt learned of the 
Tsar's capitulation. The following day, he drafted a formal 
invitation for the belligerents to enter into negotiations, 
and sent it to Tokyo and St. Petersburg.52 The Japanese 
government's acceptance of the President's overture elicited 
mixed reactions from among the Japanese public. Though 
American ambassador Lloyd Griscom later recalled that "an 
aura of peace was in the air,"53 Roosevelt's invitation was 
a "bolt out of the blue" for many of Japan's citizens. Still 
oblivious of the increasingly tenuous position of Oyama's 
forces, they confidently expected further armed triumphs, 
and believed that only the destruction of the Russian army 
could guarantee a durable peace in Manchuria. Consequently, 
they judged Roosevelt's intercession premature. Eventual 
acquiescence in governmental policy did not quell lingering 
doubts concerning Japan's chances for successful 
negotiations with Russia. Optimists stated in the Japanese 
press their belief that Russia had requested peace 
negotiations through the United States, and that Roosevelt 
and the Japanese government had reviewed and approved 
Russian terms prior to Tokyo's acceptance of American good
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offices. Less sanguine journalists held that Roosevelt's 
invitation had actually derived from his own initiative, 
rather than Russian desperation, and that the coming peace 
conference would therefore not necessarily secure an 
•'honorable peace" for Japan. Further, they reminded their 
readers of the ignominious outcome of the 1895 Shimonoseki 
Conference, and gloomily predicted another failure in 
Japanese diplomacy.54
Russia's response to Roosevelt's overture created more 
immediate problems. Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamsdorff 
neglected to inform Cassini of the Tsar's assent to a 
conference, thereby causing several days of confusion in 
Washington in which the Russian ambassador insisted that 
Meyer had misconstrued Nicholas II. Meanwhile, in St. 
Petersburg, the Russian Foreign Minister blustered to 
British ambassador Hardinge that only humanitarian 
principles had compelled the Tsar to accept Roosevelt's 
initiative, and that, in the absence of a public Japanese 
call for peace, Russia was prepared to fight indefinitely. 
Though Roosevelt received verbal assurances from Cassini 
that Russia recognized the need for peace, Lamsdorff sent a 
warning that Russia would "in no case accept conditions that 
(did) not correspond to its national honor."55
This signal from St. Petersburg renewed Roosevelt's 
concerns regarding Japan's peace terms. On June 8, the day
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on which he issued the invitations to the belligerent 
capitals, he had told Kaneko that that he now supported 
Japanese claims on Sakhalin, but remained opposed to the 
quest for an indemnity. The President emphasized his fear 
that Japanese insistence upon reparations would sabotage the 
coming conference, and added that Russia's financial 
disarray precluded its ability to compensate Japan's wartime 
expenses. Roosevelt's efforts to enlist British aid in 
persuading Japan to pursue more moderate demands proved 
fruitless. Foreign Minister Lord Henry Lansdowne believed 
Japan entitled to a substantial indemnity, despite 
Hardinge's assessment on June 13 that Japan had little hope 
of obtaining more than either a small payment or a 
territorial cession instead of money from a nation that was 
"still as arrogant as ever." In response, Lansdowne 
exclaimed to Hardinge, "Is there any case of a war of this 
kind in which the losing side has not had to pay for its 
folly or ill luck?"56
Having accepted the President's invitation to discuss 
peace, the belligerent governments, acting on his advice, 
selected the Portsmouth Navy Yard, near Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire, as the site for the upcoming conference.57 
Choosing conferees presented a more formidable task. At 
first, Prime Minister Katsura nominated Marquis Ito Hirobumi 
to lead the Japanese delegation. In a meeting of the Genro
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and other leaders, Katsura asserted that the chief 
negotiator for Japan needed to be a member of the Genro who 
had the complete trust of the Emperor and the support of the 
people. To the Emperor, the Prime Minister recommended Ito 
as the chief and Komura as the second-ranking 
plenipotentiaries. Across the Pacific, Roosevelt also hoped 
Ito would head the Japanese peacemakers, believing that he 
would exert a moderating influence upon his colleagues.58 
Japan's senior statesman, however, declined. The Emperor had 
relied heavily upon his counsel throughout the conflict, and 
did not want him to leave Tokyo. Ito himself, who had 
opposed Japan's drift toward war with Russia, believed that 
the leaders responsible for instigating hostilities should 
face the task of ending them. On one occasion, he stated, 
"One must harvest the result of what one has sown. I started 
the Sino-Japanese War, and therefore I naturally concluded 
it. I consider it in order that the present war be concluded 
by Katsura himself."59
Most importantly, Japan's leaders were already 
beginning to realize that the peace settlement would in all 
likelihood fall far short of public expectations. Lancelot 
Lawton, wartime correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, 
commented, "It was evident that the position of the Japanese 
plenipotentiary was to be compared to that of a poker player 
possessing an extremely doubtful hand."60 Ito perceived
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that, if he were to lead the peacemaking mission, he would 
return home bearing the blame for its failure to obtain 
satisfactory terms, and would alone confront the popular 
wrath of Japan. His well-known prewar advocacy of 
accommodation with Russia would render him especially 
vulnerable to charges of leniency toward the enemy.61
After Ito refused to travel to Portsmouth, the Genro 
then selected Foreign Minister Komura to lead Japan's 
delegation. Ambassador Takahira would serve as the secondary 
plenipotentiary. Genro members were extremely ambivalent 
about appointing the headstrong Komura as Japan's chief 
diplomat for the difficult negotiations ahead. Worried that 
the Foreign Minister's fixation upon expansive terms would 
jeopardize the conference, Navy Minister Yamamoto Gonnohyoe 
sought reassurance from Komura during the Genro's discussion 
of Japan's delegation: "It is our understanding that, if the 
negotiations come to the point of rupture, you will make the 
final decision only after you have obtained governmental 
instructions. We would like to obtain your assurance on this 
point for the sake of our peace of mind." Only after Komura 
answered, "Of course!" did the Genro finally decide to elect 
him to head the peace mission.62 To assist himself and 
Takahira, however, Komura chose several individuals who 
shared his hard-line views, including Honda Kumataro, his 
private secretary, and Colonel Tachibana Kaichiro, military
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advisor to the peace mission.63
Meanwhile, a cabinet meeting on June 30 drafted the 
final instructions to Japan's delegation. Once again, the 
proposed peace terms reflected Japan's need to end the war 
quickly. Three conditions were deemed "absolutely 
indispensable to achieving our war aims and guaranteeing the 
security of our Imperial nation forever”: Russian 
acknowledgment of Japanese freedom of action in Korea, 
mutual withdrawal of troops from Manchuria, and cession of 
the portion of the Liaodong Peninsula which Russia had 
leased from China, as well as the railway linking Port 
Arthur and Harbin. Four conditions were considered 
"relatively important," to be pursued "insofar as 
circumstances permit": Russian reimbursement of Japan's 
wartime expenses, the surrender to Japan of all Russian 
warships that had sought refuge in neutral harbors, cession 
of Sakhalin, and fishing rights along the coast of the 
Maritime Provinces. Finally, two additional items were to be 
used as bargaining points: future limitation of Russian 
naval strength in the Far East, and conversion of 
Vladivostok into a purely commercial port. This list of 
conditions received Imperial sanction on July 5. The 
Japanese delegation was to treat these instructions as 
guidelines, rather than rigid demands. Komura would later 
fully exploit this freedom of discretion, revising the terms
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to conform to his own agenda.64
The Russian search for emissaries proved even more 
difficult. Initially, Nicholas II strove to avoid selecting 
the able but unpopular Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 
Sergei Witte. Though Witte had once ardently advocated 
Russian commercial expansion in East Asia during his service 
as Russia's Minister of Finance, the rise of Japanese power 
in the years following the Sino-Japanese War had eventually 
tempered his Asian ambitions. One of the few Russian leaders 
who had opposed war with Japan in 1904, Witte had striven to 
restore peace at an early stage in the conflict. During the 
summer of 1904, he had attempted to open peace negotiations 
through the Japanese ambassador to Britain, Count Hayashi 
Tadasu. Outraged by this gesture, the Tsar had immediately 
quashed it. In late February of 1905, worried that the 
military debacle in Manchuria fueled the flames of 
revolution, Witte submitted a written plea to Nicholas II 
urging the commencement of negotiations. Warning that 
continuation of the conflict would spell economic and 
financial ruin for Russia, Witte vainly admonished the 
monarch, "In all things decision is requisite. But if 
decision is indispensable in happiness, it is doubly 
necessary in disaster. In disaster, resolution is the first 
step towards safety. There should be no delay. Peace 
pourparlers should at once be begun.1"65 Though Witte
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believed that his bold letter wrought a profound influence 
upon the Tsar, he was mistaken.
Having ignored Witte's advice during the war, Nicholas 
II was now unwilling to entrust him with the responsibility 
of negotiating peace. Foreign Minister Lamsdorff, who 
perceived the value of Witte's expertise on economic and 
financial issues, strongly advocated the appointment of 
Witte to the peace mission in his first recommendation to 
the Tsar on June 24, 1905. After other candidates refused to 
assume the unwelcome task of negotiating the conclusion of a 
lost war, the Tsar finally offered it to Witte. Although he 
accepted the assignment in order to serve his country and 
his own personal ambitions, Witte acidly grumbled to Finance 
Minister Vladimir Kokovtsov, "When a sewer has to be 
cleaned, they send Witte; but as soon as work of a cleaner 
and nicer kind appears, plenty of other candidates spring 
up."66 Also at the head of the Russian delegation was Baron 
Roman Rosen, Russia's prewar ambassador to Japan and 
Cassini's designated successor in Washington.67
The day after he accepted the task of leading the 
Russian mission to Portsmouth, Witte conferred with the 
Tsar. Although Nicholas II affirmed his hopes for peace, he 
emphasized his refusal to pay a kopek of indemnity or to 
cede an inch of territory. The Tsar subsequently gave Witte 
additional instructions designed to lay the foundations of
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an amicable postwar relationship between the two 
belligerents that would also preserve intact Russian 
interests in East Asia.68
The final guidelines which Witte received on July 11 
reflected St. Petersburg's persistent conviction that Japan 
had not won the war in Manchuria. His agenda opened with a 
reaffirmation of Russian readiness to continue hostilities 
should Japanese terms affront Russia's national honor. Next, 
it enumerated the conditions to which Russia would not 
submit: cession of territory, payment of reparations, 
disarmament of Vladivostok, future restriction of Russian 
naval strength in the Pacific, and cession of the railway 
line to Vladivostok. Although this report acknowledged 
Russia's loss of control over Port Arthur, it stipulated 
that Japanese acquisition of the harbor was to be subject to 
China's approval, since Russia had originally leased it from 
Beijing. The railway from Port Arthur was to be sold to 
China. The official Russian position on Korea was 
contradictory. Though it stated that Russia would recognize 
Japanese supremacy in the peninsula, it demanded that Japan 
recognize Korea's full independence and refrain from 
bringing troops into Korea and fortifying the 
Korean-Manchurian border.69
Although Witte concurred with these proposals, he 
disagreed with the Tsar's belief in Russian ability to
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continue the war. Russia's urgent need for peace was soon 
underscored in mid-July by a sobering report from Grand Duke 
Nikolai Nikolaevich, who had recently presided over a somber 
conference of Russia's military leaders. The Grand Duke 
stated that Linievich's forces, with reinforcements, could 
eventually drive Oyama's armies back to Port Arthur and the 
Korean border. Unfortunately, it was estimated that such an 
endeavor would require another year of hostilities, and 
would cost Russia one billion rubles and as many as 500,000 
casualties.70 Witte knew that wartime inflation had already 
doubled the supply of rubles in circulation; prolongation of 
the war therefore invited financial collapse.71 Though 
Witte asserted to the Associated Press that Russia would not 
seek peace at any price, such posturing was largely for the 
sake of appearances. The Grand Duke's alarming assessment 
reinforced Witte's determination to restore peace.72
At the same time, Russia's growing monetary instability 
also impelled Witte to oppose paying reparations to Japan.
In mid-July of 1905, he travelled to Paris in search of 
further French loans to Russia. He discovered that France 
was willing to help Russia pay an indemnity to Japan, but 
refused to finance a continuation of hostilities. Prime 
Minister Maurice Rouvier advised that Russia needed peace, 
even if Japan's terms included a demand for reparations. He 
reminded Witte that the indemnity France had paid to Germany
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in 1871 had not tarnished French national dignity. Witte 
retorted that Russia might reconsider its position on the 
indemnity issue when the Japanese armies surrounded Moscow. 
Anxious to learn Japan's terms, Witte then consulted Robert 
McCormick, now the American ambassador to France. Likewise 
uncertain of the nature of Japan's agenda, McCormick 
mentioned an article in the North American Review which 
predicted a Japanese demand for an indemnity. Witte warned 
that, should Japan's envoys prove insistent upon this issue, 
"(his) stay in the United States will be short."73
Such statements from Witte exacerbated Roosevelt's 
fears that the conference would end in failure. In a letter 
to Spring Rice on July 24, the President fumed about "the 
monstrous ineptitude" of "the amorphous body which in Russia 
stands as the Government," and opined that "Witte has talked 
like a fool since he was appointed.1,74 Five days later, he 
wrote to Whitelaw Reid, the American ambassador to Britain, 
"...if the Russians play the fool to the extent that Witte's 
published statements would imply, the Japs will have to go 
on with the war and the Russians will thoroughly deserve the 
additional disasters which they will encounter...If (the 
Russians) persistently refuse to see any light, all we can 
do is to shrug our shoulders and let them go on to their 
fate."75 Ambassador Griscom in Tokyo received 
Roosevelt's bleakest estimation on July 27: "Before you
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receive this, the peace negotiations I suppose will have 
come to an end, and I rather think they will end in 
failure.1,76
In response, the President redoubled his efforts to 
persuade the Japanese to abandon the terms which jeopardized 
the conference, but to little avail. The British government 
remained aloof, maintaining that for London to urge 
moderation upon Tokyo would break the spirit of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. Frustrated, Roosevelt asked Spring 
Rice why it was proper for France to urge peace upon Russia, 
but improper for Britain to follow suit with Japan. 
Privately, the President even began to wonder whether London 
was encouraging Japanese ambitions.77 Further discussions 
with Kaneko were equally fruitless. Unable to move his 
former Harvard classmate, Roosevelt finally recommended that 
Japan first obtain Russian agreement on the basic idea of 
reparations without revealing an amount. If successful on 
this point, the Japanese negotiators could then discuss the 
size of the payment to be made.78
Shortly thereafter, an opportunity to urge flexibility 
upon St. Petersburg emerged. To Russia's chagrin, Japan had 
refused to agree to an armistice prior to the conference. 
Consequently, the Tsar worried about a possible Japanese 
seizure of Russian territory before negotiations began. On 
July 7, his fears were realized as Japanese forces invaded
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Sakhalin Island. By the end of the month, the entire island 
was under Japanese control.79 Foreign observers quickly 
perceived that the possession of this Russian territory 
greatly strengthened Japan's hand for the coming conference. 
The New York Times correspondent in the Russian capital 
commented, "the control of Sakhalin puts a powerful lever in 
the possession of Japanese diplomacy, which finally has 
something tangible in its hands to throw upon the scales 
with the sword in the coming conference." In fact, he 
asserted, "Japan has now in her hands enough trumps to take 
the game."80
Attempting at the time to induce the Japanese to dilute 
their peace terms, Roosevelt discerned in the fall of 
Sakhalin an opportunity to soften the Russian position, as 
well. Through Meyer, he bluntly told Lamsdorff that Russia 
had no hope of victory, and that a reasonable indemnity and 
cession of Sakhalin were small prices to pay for peace, in 
comparison with what Japan would eventually demand if Russia 
persisted. According to the President, Russian unwillingness 
to admit defeat would result in the irretrievable loss of 
Eastern Siberia.81 To Roosevelt's dismay, his warning 
failed to induce St. Petersburg to muzzle Witte.
During these efforts to foster harmonious negotiations 
between the belligerents, the President also prepared 
Washington's official recognition of Japanese military
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supremacy in East Asia. Already, he had accepted Japan's 
refusal to allow Chinese participation in the peace 
conference.82 Specifically, however, Roosevelt's attention 
focused upon Korea, under Japanese control since February of 
1904. As early as June of 1904, he had accepted Japan's 
domination of the peninsula as part of the postwar order.
The lack of American strength in the region, coupled with a 
pro-Japanese trend in American public opinion (which he 
shared), impelled his acquiescence. American possession of 
the Philippines also imposed limitations on Washington's 
East Asian policy. The destruction of Russia's Baltic Fleet 
in May of 1905 established Japan as the primary naval power 
in the western Pacific Ocean. Painfully aware of the 
tenuousness of the American grasp on the Philippine 
archipelago, Roosevelt sought to avoid confrontation between 
the United States and Japan, and to direct the focus of 
Japanese expansion toward the Asian continent (to the extent 
dictated by his vision of the postwar balance of power 
between Russia and Japan). In the summer of 1905, propaganda 
from the few Americans who had supported Russia during the 
war predicted eventual Japanese aggression against the 
Philippine islands. Though he doubtless placed little 
credence in such alarmism, Roosevelt nevertheless desired a 
formal understanding with Japan which would clarify the 
relationship between the empires of the two nations.83
87
Accordingly, in late July of 1905, the Rough Rider sent 
Secretary of War William Howard Taft on a confidential 
mission to Tokyo to formalize a Japanese-American modus 
vivendi. On July 27, Taft met with Prime Minister Katsura. 
Following a lengthy discussion, the two statesmen drafted an 
"agreed memorandum of conversation," in which the United 
States recognized the Japanese protectorate over Korea and 
Japan disavowed any designs on the Philippines. The 
Taft-Katsura Agreement did not embody a quid pro quo 
arrangement between the United States and Japan. Rather, it 
expressed in writing an exchange of views in which Taft 
reaffirmed American acceptance of Japanese suzerainty over 
Korea, and Katsura dispelled the rhetoric of the pro-Russian 
minority in the United States.84 Still, as historian John 
Wilz has observed, the accord "put an American seal on the 
death warrant of an independent Korea.1,85
As Taft and Katsura framed this agreement, the Japanese 
peace delegation arrived in the United States. Komura and 
his entourage had left the port city of Yokohama on July 8 
amid great fanfare. With shouts of "Banzai!", over five 
thousand Japanese citizens had gathered at the port to bid 
farewell to the delegation that would end a glorious war 
with an honorable peace. Komura sadly joked to one of his 
subordinates, "When I return, these people will turn into 
unruly mobs that will attack me with mud pies or pistols. So
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I had better enjoy their 'Banzai' now.”86 Arriving in New 
York City in late July, Komura immediately consulted Kaneko. 
The Foreign Minister confided that, though Tokyo had 
advocated lenient terms, he would press the demands for an 
indemnity and Sakhalin. Aware that his position would create 
difficulties in the conference, Komura instructed Kaneko to 
secure an arrangement with Roosevelt whereby the President 
would intervene in the event of an impending rupture.87
Two days later, Komura and Takahira visited Roosevelt 
at his summer home, Sagamore Hill, in Oyster Bay, Long 
Island. The Foreign Minister gave the President a list of 
Japan's peace terms which did not differentiate between 
those which Tokyo had judged essential and optional. In 
response, Roosevelt first recommended that Japan withdraw 
its demands for the disarmament of Vladivostok and the 
surrender of interned Russian warships. Then, he focused 
once again on the indemnity issue. Informing Komura of 
Witte's bold statements in Paris, Roosevelt said that he 
would endeavor to soften Witte's position, but warned that 
Japanese insistence upon this point could prove fatal to the 
negotiations. Prolongation of hostilities might yield 
further armed victories for Japan, but would not make the 
obtainment of reparations any easier. After this meeting, 
Komura concluded that Roosevelt wanted Japan to reduce its 
demand for payment to "a very low sum.1* When the President
subsequently intimated to Kaneko that Russia might be 
persuaded to pay a small amount of money if it was not 
designated as an indemnity, Kaneko pointed out the Japanese 
public's clamor for a large indemnity, and added that 
Japan's postwar financial stability depended upon 
reparations from Russia. In short, asserted Kaneko, a 
sizable indemnity was "absolutely necessary."88
Roosevelt's fears that Witte would prove inflexible 
were largely unfounded. His bombastic speeches in Paris 
notwithstanding, Russia's chief negotiator recognized his 
nation's need for peace. Though given strict guidelines by a 
government that still refused to concede defeat, Witte was 
privately willing to transcend his instructions in order to 
end the catastrophic war. In fact, according to Rosen's 
later recollection, Witte was prepared to surrender Sakhalin 
and pay an indemnity, "provided it could be accomplished 
under some plausible disguise" by the time he arrived in New 
York City on August 2.89 Rosen himself, who had replaced 
Cassini as the Russian ambassador to the United States in 
early July, more closely represented the views of the Tsar. 
Prior to Witte's arrival, Rosen visited Roosevelt at 
Sagamore Hill, and "ventured to controvert the view the 
President seemed to entertain as to the precarious character 
of our position and the consequent necessity for us to 
conclude peace at any sacrifice." He informed the President
90
that two corps of Russia7s best troops, usually stationed in 
the western part of the country, were then travelling 
eastward to the war zone. Furthermore, he reminded the Rough 
Rider, Oyama's forces had not advanced since their victory 
at Mukden the previous March. These contentions, however, 
failed to impress Roosevelt.90
Soon after Witte7s arrival in the United States, the 
two Russian diplomats discussed Nicholas II7s prohibitions 
against ceding territory and paying an indemnity. Since 
Sakhalin was under Japanese control by that time, Witte and 
Rosen concurred "that the presence of irremediable facts and 
conditions" necessitated compromise on the first point.91 
Initially, the two were divided over the indemnity question. 
Whereas Witte favored a payment to Japan to secure peace,
Rosen was not convinced that the success of the coming
conference depended upon Russian capitulation on this issue. 
Rosen asserted his belief that Japan needed peace more 
desperately than Russia. Indeed, he suspected that Tokyo had 
secretly requested Roosevelt7s intercession.92 Lastly, the 
two men at first differed on whether the time was ripe for 
peace, in light of Russia7s domestic turmoil. Whereas Witte 
held that immediate cessation of the war would ease 
political tensions, Rosen contended that "the conclusion of 
peace after a series of defeats without our Army being given
a chance to redeem the glory of our arms by victory" would
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exacerbate the unrest.93 Both concluded, however, that this 
last issue was academic, "as it concerned a question that 
had already been settled by a higher power in a sense to 
which our very presence at Portsmouth bore witness."94
Witte and Rosen soon reconciled their differing views 
on the remaining points of contention, "which enabled (them) 
to conduct the negotiations as if (they) had been one man 
with one mind, one will, and one heart beating for (their) 
country."95 During his first audience with Roosevelt on 
August 4, Witte reiterated the official, hard-line Russian 
position, vowing that, should Japan reject Russia's terms, 
the Russian forces would "conduct a defensive war to the 
last extreme, and we will see who will last the longest." 
Alienated by Witte's brusque manner and dismayed by his 
intransigence, Roosevelt later gloomily wrote to Senator 
Lodge, "I do not think the Russians mean peace."96 On the 
outcome of the approaching conference rested the fate of the 
President's prestige and foreign policy objectives in East 
Asia, as well as that of the combatants.
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CHAPTER III:
"THE BITTEREST DOSE JAPAN HAS EVER BEEN COMPELLED TO TAKE":
REACHING AN ILLUSORY PEACE AT PORTSMOUTH, 1905
On August 9, 1905, Komura and his colleagues drafted a 
revised version of Japan's terms. Once again, Tokyo's 
distinction between required and optional conditions was 
discarded; instead, the proposals were listed in random 
order. Following Roosevelt's advice, they deleted the word 
"indemnity" from their terms, replacing it with a demand 
that Russia reimburse Japan for "the actual expenses of the 
war." Another sign of the President's influence was the 
omission of the call for demilitarization of Vladivostok. 
When Komura submitted the new list of demands to the 
Russians during the first formal session on August 10, he 
characterized it as "being shot through with the spirit of 
compromise and moderation," reflecting the Japanese 
Emperor's desire for an amicable peace. Witte and his 
assistants did not agree. G. A. Planson, the Russian 
mission's secretary, exclaimed that "the Japanese conditions 
were more heavy than anything it was possible to expect."1
Subsequently, in a tense private meeting, the Russian 
delegation formulated written replies to these demands. 
Qualified approval was given to all but four of the terms. 
For example, though the Russians acknowledged Japanese 
primacy in Korea, they stipulated that Russian subjects 
would enjoy the same rights as other foreigners in the 
peninsula, that Japan would not impair the sovereignty of 
the Korean Emperor, and that Japan would not fortify the
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Korean-Manchurian border. (The evident contradiction between 
the Japanese demand for control of Korea and the Russian 
demand for the Korean Emperor's sovereign rights was not 
addressed.) The four rejected terms were, predictably, the 
demands for payment, Sakhalin, the surrender of interned 
Russian warships, and the future limitation of Russian naval 
strength in East Asia.2
The future status of Korea dominated the opening 
negotiations, due to the Russian strictures. On August 12, 
Komura developed a revised article which accommodated two of 
the three Russian conditions. In return for Russian 
recognition of Japanese supremacy in Korea, Japan would 
guarantee the rights of Russian nationals residing there. 
Also, the new proposal imposed mutual restrictions on 
military fortifications on the Korean-Manchurian border. 
Russia's attempt to uphold Korean sovereignty ignited fierce 
debate. Eventually, the delegations adopted a compromise in 
which the final treaty would not mention Korean sovereignty, 
and the conference minutes and press releases would contain 
Japanese pledges to consult Seoul before taking any future 
measures that curtailed Korean sovereignty.3
The next area of concern was the disposition of 
Manchuria. Komura proposed the simultaneous evacuation of 
the region by the belligerent armies. He also required from 
Russia a unilateral promise to uphold the Open Door policy
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in China. In contrast, Japanese withdrawal from the region 
would be contingent upon Chinese ability to govern it. Witte 
persuaded Komura to abandon Tokyo's prerequisite for 
evacuation, but failed to induce the Japanese delegation to 
reciprocate Russia's pledge on behalf of the Open Door. 
Komura contended that Japan, unlike Russia, had done nothing 
to create suspicion among the nations with interests in 
China, and therefore did not share Russia's obligation to 
formally disavow further designs there. According to him, a 
joint pledge on behalf of the Open Door would be analogous 
to a joint promise to a judge from a policeman and a burglar 
that neither would steal again. Finally, Witte acceded to 
this point.4
Both sides easily reached agreement on a mutual promise 
to refrain from obstructing future foreign investments in 
Manchuria. Subsequently, the delegations agreed on the 
transfer to Japan of Russia's lease upon Port Arthur and 
adjacent territory. The Russians sought to subject this 
transfer to Chinese approval, since they had originally 
leased the territory from Beijing. Though Komura admitted 
that future negotiations between Beijing and Tokyo would be 
necessary to confirm Japan's acquisition of the harbor and 
its environs, he did not want the Russian transfer to depend 
upon Chinese consent. In the end, Witte and Komura concurred 
that the transfer would be "subject to the consent of the
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Chinese government," but that Beijing's approval would be 
construed as a mere formality. Subsequent debate centered 
upon the railway linking Port Arthur and Harbin. The two 
sides eventually agreed that Japanese ownership of the 
railway would extend northward from the harbor to the town 
of Changchun (between Harbin and Mukden).5
Japan's struggle to wrest Sakhalin and reimbursement 
from Russia dominated the remainder of the conference. On 
August 15, Komura first broached the subject of Sakhalin, 
which Japanese forces had seized the previous month. He 
argued that the island was a geographical continuation of 
the Japanese archipelago, and therefore was essential to 
Japan's national security. When Witte mentioned the 1875 
Russo-Japanese treaty by which Japan had relinquished claim 
to Sakhalin in return for Russian recognition of Japan's 
possession of the Kurile Islands, Komura retorted that Tokyo 
had negotiated under duress. The Japanese people regarded 
Russian occupation of the island as an act of aggression. 
Witte countered that, after thirty years of Russian hegemony 
over Sakhalin, the Russian people considered it Russian 
territory. He also warned that Japan's refusal to evacuate 
the island would perpetuate animosity between the two 
countries. Two hours of debate failed to reduce the chasm 
dividing the two negotiators, who finally decided to defer 
the issue until a later session. Meanwhile, the revelation
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of Japanese peace terms steeled Tsarist resolve. On August 
16, Nicholas II wrote to Lamsdorff, "On the loss of Sakhalin 
there cannot be any talk. The Russian people would never 
forgive me for giving any of our land to any enemy and my 
own conscience would not allow it either." St. Petersburg 
then ordered Witte to remain firm in denying the island to 
Japan.6
Japan's demand for monetary compensation proved even 
more contentious. On August 14, Roosevelt, still fearing 
that the indemnity issue would endanger the conference, had 
implored Kaneko to urge moderation upon his countrymen at 
Portsmouth. Although the President did not counsel complete 
abandonment of the demand for payment, he wanted Japan to 
reduce the amount sought to a minimal level. Three days 
later, in a particularly rancorous session, Komura and Witte 
debated at length on this issue. Witte declared that only 
nations unable to continue fighting paid indemnities to 
their adversaries, and asserted that Russia was prepared to 
continue hostilities. Only Japanese occupation of Moscow or 
St. Petersburg would justify Tokyo's claim to reimbursement. 
Exasperated, Komura admitted that Russia could continue 
fighting, but asserted that Japan could do the same, adding 
sarcastically, "In order to estimate how the war situation 
will be in the future, you, plenipotentiary, know the 
results of the past well enough to judge."7
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Eventually, the indemnity issue was also set aside, but 
the verbal duel continued. Witte flatly rejected Japan's 
demand for the Russian warships that had been interned in 
neutral harbors, claiming that it violated international 
law. He also balked at the Japanese demand for the future 
limitation of Russian naval power in the Far East, but 
assured Komura that the Russian navy needed to concentrate 
its vessels in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, rather than 
the Pacific Ocean. Finally, he vowed that the Russian 
opposition to ceding territory and paying money was 
unshakable, and suggested that the final session of the 
conference be held on August 21. His Japanese counterpart 
calmly accepted this implicit threat to break up the 
negotiations without concluding a peace treaty.8
That evening (on August 17), in the privacy of their 
hotel rooms, Witte and Komura warned their respective 
governments of impending rupture, and urged that compromise 
was necessary in order to prevent further bloodshed in 
Manchuria. In his message to Lamsdorff, Witte speculated 
that Japan would drop its demands for interned warships and 
the future limitation of Russian naval strength in the Far 
East. He advocated continued resistance on the indemnity 
issue, calling it a matter of national honor. Then, he 
strongly advised ceding Sakhalin to Japan. He pointed out 
that Japan wielded de facto control over the island, and
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contended that, even if Russia were to reclaim it, Japan 
would still dominate the surrounding waters. Despite his 
previous verbal altercation with Komura, Witte was convinced 
that continuation of hostilities would be more disastrous 
for Russia than an unpleasant peace settlement. Likewise, 
Komura warned Tokyo of a possible failure of negotiations, 
and outlined a tentative compromise plan. He informed 
Katsura that he would withdraw the demands for interned 
warships and future limitation of Russian naval power. He 
would also ask Roosevelt to send a direct appeal to the 
Tsar. Later that evening, Komura telegraphed Kaneko (who was 
still in New York City) with instructions to seek the 
President's help.9
This shared sense of urgency enabled the two 
delegations to make concessions on the following day, August
18. First, Komura gave Witte a statement declaring Japan's 
readiness to abandon the terms concerning interned vessels 
and Russian naval power, provided the Russians were willing 
to discuss Sakhalin and the indemnity. In response, Witte 
presented a compromise plan in which Russia would obtain the 
northern half of Sakhalin, and Japan would keep the southern 
half. He reiterated that St. Petersburg would never pay war 
reparations beyond the expenses of caring for prisoners of 
war. Lastly, he warned that, although he personally wished 
for peace, martial passions were reviving throughout Russia.
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Komura replied that the Japanese public expected a generous 
peace settlement to conclude a victorious war. He then 
attempted to incorporate the indemnity demand into Witte's 
proposal, suggesting that Japan would retrocede the northern 
half of Sakhalin in return for a payment of 1.2 billion yen 
(which Tokyo had calculated to be the sum of Japan's wartime 
expenses). Witte countered that the Tsar would never accept 
such a thinly disguised indemnity, and that Japan could 
never hope to obtain such a large sum from Russia. At 
Komura's prodding, however, both delegations included the 
monetary amount in their reports of the compromise plan to 
their respective governments. Finally, both sides agreed to 
postpone the next session until the following Tuesday,
August 22, in order to give their governments time to 
respond to the compromise proposal.10
Three days later, on August 21, Komura and Witte 
received their governments' answers. Tokyo approved of the 
compromise plan, and authorized Komura to reduce the price 
for northern Sakhalin if necessary. In contrast, the Tsar 
said "nyet," arguing that "in essence the Japanese are 
rearranging their demands." A subsequent note from St. 
Petersburg ordered Witte to dissolve the conference if the 
Japanese failed to retreat from their "excessive demands." 
Undeterred, Witte cabled several appeals to the Russian 
capital for the surrender of Sakhalin. He warned that,
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although world opinion would support the refusal to grant an 
indemnity, it would not countenance the refusal to cede 
Sakhalin. If Russia resisted both terms, the world community 
would blame it for the continuation of hostilities.11
The same day, August 21, the Japanese delegation, 
through Kaneko, sought Roosevelt's intervention. Conferring 
with his former Harvard classmate, the President learned of 
the Witte-Komura compromise plan and of Tokyo's acceptance 
of it. He recommended to Kaneko that Japan halve the 
demanded sum to 600 million yen, and seek an additional 150 
million yen to compensate for the care of Russian prisoners 
of war. Later that day, responding to the Japanese request, 
Roosevelt drafted his appeal to Nicholas II. He urged the 
Russian monarch to accept "in principle" the retrocession of 
northern Sakhalin in return for payment to Japan. The 
specific sum would be negotiated subsequent to the 
restoration of peace. In conclusion, Roosevelt once again 
warned of the dire consequences to Russia if the war were to 
resume, predicting that Japan would conquer eastern Siberia. 
The President sent copies of this appeal to Paris and 
Berlin, seeking their assistance and assuring them that he 
would advise the Japanese to choose peace regardless of the 
size of payment obtained.12
Still hoping to soften the Japanese position on the 
indemnity issue, Roosevelt again tried to influence Kaneko
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over the next several days, contending that Japan had 
already achieved its basic war aims. On August 22, he 
relayed to Kaneko a telegram which he had received from 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge the day before. Echoing the 
President's sentiments, Lodge had written that "it is the 
height of folly to continue that war...If (Japan) renews the 
fighting merely to get money, she will not get the money, 
and she will turn sympathy from her in this country and 
elsewhere very rapidly."13 Asserting that it was Japan's 
"ethical duty" to cease hostilities, Roosevelt reminded 
Kaneko of the considerable gains Japan had achieved: "She 
has won the control of Korea and Manchuria; she has doubled 
her own fleet in destroying that of Russia; she has Port 
Arthur, Dalny, the Manchurian railroad, she has Sakhalin." 
Resumption of warfare to obtain the indemnity would "not be 
worth (Japan's) while, when so to continue it would probably 
eat up more money than she could at the end get back from 
Russia." He implored the Japanese to "show (their) 
leadership in matters ethical no less than in matters 
military" by deciding for peace.14 The President also 
invoked American history in the attempt to convince Kaneko 
that land was a better prize for victory than money. He 
cited the successful American wars against Mexico and Spain; 
on both occasions, the United States had paid its vanquished 
foe for territory won in battle. Finally, Roosevelt argued
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that further Japanese conquests in Manchuria would fail to 
win compliance from Russia, and asserted that, if he were in 
Komura's place, he would abandon the indemnity demand.15
In response, Kaneko informed the President of Komura's 
willingness to reduce substantially the amount sought by 
Japan. Despite his previous militance, the Foreign Minister 
now would be satisfied with a sum ranging from 600 to 800 
million yen.16 In addition, Kaneko again upheld the 
correctness of Japan's quest for payment. Referring to 
Lodge's letter, Kaneko asked Roosevelt to dispel the 
Senator's misconceptions:
Our Government is not demanding the indemnity 
beside keeping the whole island of Sakhalin. We 
have, as you know, surrendered a half of the 
island, for which we demand a payment - not 
indemnity - this is perfectly reasonable and 
just on our part.17
Unfortunately, Kaneko's emphasis on this distinction soon 
lost credibility. During the afternoon session on August 23, 
Witte wrested from Komura an admission that the payment 
sought for northern Sakhalin was actually the demand for 
indemnity in disguised form. In another deft maneuver, Witte 
queried whether Japan would accept the whole of Sakhalin 
without payment. Komura's refusal of this offer placed Japan 
in the position of continuing the war for money.18
112
As the deadlock on the reparations issue deepened in 
Portsmouth, Roosevelt anxiously awaited the results of his 
appeal to Tsar Nicholas II. On August 23, Meyer presented 
the President's plea to the Russian monarch. Initially, the 
Tsar remained stubborn, quoting from a letter that he had 
just written to Wilhelm II in which he had vowed not to cede 
territory or pay money. He reminded Meyer that the Japanese 
army was thousands of miles from Moscow and St. Petersburg, 
and that it had not advanced since its victory at Mukden the 
previous March. The Witte-Komura compromise proposal was 
unacceptable, argued Nicholas II, since the division of 
Sakhalin would perpetuate tensions between the two nations. 
Meyer countered that Sakhalin was not part of Russia proper, 
pointing out that Russia's claim to the island only dated 
back to the Russo-Japanese treaty of 1875. This contention 
brought results. At last, the Russian monarch agreed to cede 
the southern half of Sakhalin. When pressed for a pledge to 
pay for the northern half, however, the Tsar adamantly 
refused. He would amply reimburse Japan for its care of 
Russian prisoners of war, but would never agree to a payment 
that could be construed as a war indemnity. Still, having 
relented on the Sakhalin issue, the Tsar indicated to Meyer 
that he would not enforce his earlier injunction to Witte to 
break up the conference. The next day, August 24, Lamsdorff 
informed Witte of the Tsar's decision to cede southern
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Sakhalin without payment, calling it Russia's "final 
proposal." Subsequent appeals from Roosevelt to the Tsar and 
Witte to accept payment "in principle," with the amount to 
be determined by subsequent negotiations, met with flat 
rejections.19
On August 26, Witte informed Komura of the Tsar's 
concession, warning that the Russian delegation would not 
make further offers. He reminded Komura of the resurgence of 
pro-war sentiment in Russia, and of Linievich's readiness to 
launch a counteroffensive in Manchuria. Prolongation of 
negotiations would not soften the Russian terms. Taken 
aback, Japan's Foreign Minister requested postponement of 
the concluding session until Monday, August 28, pending 
final instructions from Tokyo. Perhaps venting his growing 
frustration toward Russian rigidity on the indemnity issue, 
Komura cabled Tokyo that evening with news of Russia's 
refusal to abandon its position on both key issues of 
Sakhalin and reparations. He then informed his government of 
his decision to break off negotiations with Witte. From his 
communications, Tokyo did not learn of the Tsar's decision 
to cede southern Sakhalin.20
Komura's bombshell arrived in Tokyo at a time in which 
the Japanese government was reluctantly considering further 
diminution of the amount of monetary compensation sought 
from Russia. Kaneko had relayed Roosevelt's messages on the
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indemnity question to Tokyo. The President's advice was a 
bitter pill for Japan's leaders, who were only too aware of 
the burgeoning demands of the Japanese public for a huge 
payment from Russia. They had, however, decided that Japan's 
need for peace outweighed its need for war reparations, and 
were in the process of drafting new instructions for the 
delegation which authorized it to further reduce the 
demanded sum when Komura's telegram arrived. Stung into 
action, Katsura ordered his Foreign Minister to postpone the 
last session until August 29, to allow time for the Japanese 
government to formulate final instructions. Several of 
Japan's leaders then framed revised orders for Komura. 
Influenced by Navy Minister Yamamoto Gonnohyoe, these 
instructions called for retention of Sakhalin, but 
abandonment of the claim for an indemnity. After a lengthy 
debate on this proposal, the Genro and the cabinet members 
diluted it still further. Komura was now to withdraw both 
controversial demands in order to secure peace.21
Meanwhile, both delegations in Portsmouth were 
preparing for imminent departure. Witte agreed to the 
Japanese request to defer the final session until August 29, 
but asserted that the passage of extra time would not change 
the final Russian offer.22 In Oyster Bay, a disheartened 
President, unaware of Tokyo's increasing desperation, was 
prepared to concede defeat. He blamed the Russians for the
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impasse. On August 25, Roosevelt wrote to his son Kermit, "I 
am having my hair turned gray by dealing with the Russian 
and Japanese peace negotiators. The Japanese ask too much, 
but the Russians are ten times worse than the Japs because 
they are so stupid and won't tell the truth."23 Messages 
from Portsmouth predicting failure deepened Roosevelt's 
pessimism. Finally, in a memorandum to Kaneko's secretary, 
the Rough Rider expressed his resignation on August 27:
Tell (Kaneko) that the President has striven to 
prepare the Associated Press for the break, 
explaining to them that it is Russia's fault, but 
that unless he hears something new,...he will not 
try to do anything further in the matter. It seems 
to him useless for him to add another word to 
what he has said to the Tsar.24
The tension was soon broken. On the afternoon of August 
28, Komura, who had been willing to bring the conference to 
the brink of dissolution over the issues of Sakhalin and war 
reparations, received the new orders from Tokyo. The 
Japanese government's retreat on both issues shocked its 
delegation. Thunderstruck, Komura's private secretary, Honda 
Kumataro, loudly denounced his government's decision: "What 
a shameful thing it is!"25 The stoic Foreign Minister 
vainly strove to bolster the spirits of his crestfallen 
colleagues while preparing for the next day's session.
Momentous developments in Tokyo soon brought some cheer
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to the Japanese negotiators. Shortly after the Japanese 
government cabled its orders to Komura, British ambassador 
Sir Claude MacDonald summoned Ishii Kikujiro, then the head 
of the commercial bureau of the foreign ministry. Through 
MacDonald, Ishii learned of the Tsar's August 23 decision to 
cede southern Sakhalin to Japan. Meyer had informed the 
British embassy in St. Petersburg of his audience with the 
Russian monarch, and it was standard practice for the 
British Foreign Office to relay important information to 
other posts.26 Regarding this revelation to be "an act of 
Providence,"27 Ishii quickly informed Katsura. The Prime 
Minister rapidly obtained consent from the cabinet, Genro, 
and Emperor to dispatch revised instructions to Komura, in 
which he was to demand the southern half of the contested 
island without payment for the northern portion.28 Tokyo 
rushed its new instructions to Portsmouth. Still somewhat 
chagrined by the Japanese government's compromise on the two 
troublesome issues, the Foreign Minister received the 
revised orders, muttering, "This is what I thought they 
would tell me."29
Meanwhile, Witte received another message from 
Lamsdorff. The Tsar now ordered his delegation to dissolve 
the conference on the next day, regardless of any further 
developments in the negotiations. Defiantly, Nicholas II 
concluded, "I prefer to continue the war than to await
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gracious concessions on the part of Japan." Rosen favored 
obeying the Russian monarch. Witte, on the other hand, 
decided that, on August 29, he would instead repeat his 
August 18 offer to cede southern Sakhalin to Japan, without 
reparations. This way, if Komura refused this condition, the 
blame for the resulting failure of the conference would fall 
upon Japan, rather than Russia.30
The next morning's session began with a private meeting 
between the four plenipotentiaries, in which the two sides 
informally agreed to the division of Sakhalin and the 
withdrawal of the indemnity demand. Shortly afterward,
Komura and Witte made the compromise official during the 
formal negotiating session. They specified that the island 
would be partitioned along the fiftieth parallel, and 
concurred on a mutual prohibition against military 
installations there. Both nations would honor freedom of 
navigation in the Strait of La Perouse (south of the island) 
and in the Strait of Tartary (between the island and the 
mainland) .31
Soon afterward, Witte's personal secretary, Ivan 
Korostovetz, telephoned the reporters at the hotel to give 
them the good news that peace was assured. During a break in 
the session, Witte triumphantly cabled St. Petersburg with 
the report that "Japan has accepted our demands concerning 
peace conditions...Russia will remain a great power in the
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Far East, the same great power she was until now and which 
she will always remain." He also sent a congratulatory note 
to Roosevelt: "To you History will award the glory of having 
taken the generous initiative in bringing about the 
conference, whose labors will now probably result in 
establishing a peace honorable to both sides."32 Though he 
did not share his counterpart's exuberance, Komura likewise 
notified Tokyo and expressed gratitude to the President: "I 
beg to thank you again, Mr. President, for all you have done 
in the interest of peace...Owing to your earnest and 
unceasing efforts and the magnanimity of His Majesty the 
Emperor of Japan, peace, in the interest of humanity and 
civilization, is assured."33 Roosevelt replied with a 
telegram praising Japan for its "wisdom and magnanimity... in 
its hour of triumph."34
The divisive issues finally resolved, the two 
delegations then addressed several residual points over the 
next several days. After receiving authorization from their 
respective governments, Komura and Witte signed an armistice 
protocol and established an eighteen-month time limit for 
the military evacuation of Manchuria. The negotiators then 
agreed that their nations would exchange prisoners of war 
and reimburse each other for the costs of caring for them. 
Since Japan had spent much more than Russia in this area, 
Russia would pay Japan the difference between the two
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amounts. They committed their nations to a future revision 
of the existing Russo-Japanese commercial treaty. Russia and 
Japan would also discuss connecting their Manchurian 
railways once peace was restored.35
The Portsmouth Conference came to a close with the 
signing of the peace treaty on the afternoon of Tuesday, 
September 5, 1905.36 The ordeal reinforced American 
admiration of Japan and contempt for Russia. The American 
press hailed Japan's willingness to sacrifice in the name of 
peace as "a most impressive lesson in moderation, 
self-restraint, and consummate world statesmanship.1,37 
Writing to William Rockhill, the American ambassador to 
China, on August 29, Roosevelt stated, "I was pro-Japanese 
before, but after my experience with the peace 
commissioners, I am far stronger pro-Japanese than ever."38 
In Roosevelt's view, Japan's final decision to compromise 
derived as much from the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance on August 1239 as from the prudence of its 
leaders. He surmised that the renewed alliance allayed 
Japanese fears of future Russian aggression. To Sir Henry 
Mortimer Durand, the British ambassador in Washington, the 
President wrote on September 4, "I have no doubt that the 
signing of the treaty between England and Japan was a 
powerful factor in inducing Japan to be wise and reasonable 
as to terms."40
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Japanese public reaction to the Portsmouth Treaty 
sorely tested this laudatory perception of the Asian island 
nation. Nationalistic newspapers in Japan, which had 
heightened their readers' expectations of a generous peace 
settlement, began to blast the government as rumors of its 
concessions emerged. Still unaware of the actual military 
situation in Manchuria, firebrands in the Japanese press 
argued that the peace settlement failed to achieve the 
primary objective of eliminating the Russian threat in Korea 
and Manchuria, and urged the Emperor to reject the coming 
treaty. A scathing article in the Yorozo Choho on September 
1 accused Komura of betraying Japan:
The glory of our Imperial nation, demonstrated to 
all the world by our military triumphs, has been 
completely erased by none other than our 
plenipotentiary. It is (he) who has smeared the 
face of the ever-victorious nation. It is (he) 
who has acted miserably on the international 
stage and put himself to shame. On the day of 
his return, he should be met with flags of mourning. 
Every person in the city (of Tokyo) should shut 
the door of his house and turn away from him. Any 
who welcome this soft fellow, who has invited 
unprecedented humiliation upon our nation, are 
wretched people with no blood, no public mind, 
no sense of righteousness.41
Other Japanese newspapers condemned the treaty as "an insult 
to the nation" and "the bitterest dose the nation has ever 
been compelled to take."42 Very few Tokyo newspapers, such
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as the government-owned Kokumin Shimbun, supported the peace 
settlement, attempting to convince their readers that Japan 
had abandoned only its secondary war aims, and that further 
prosecution of hostilities would exact a ruinous cost from 
the Japanese nation.43
Such counsel fell upon deaf ears, as Japanese citizens 
explosively expressed their outrage. Ominously, the upheaval 
in the Japanese capital soon assumed an anti-American tone. 
Protestors mutilated photographs of Roosevelt,44 and 
informed the American embassy of an impending visit, in 
order to "express appreciation for the part the President 
had played in depriving Japan of the fruits of war."45 On 
the evening of September 5, American ambassador Lloyd 
Griscom and railroad magnate Edward H. Harriman attended a 
dinner party given by Japan's Finance Minister, Baron Sone 
Arasuke. Japanese crowds stoned two members of the American 
embassy as they travelled to Sone's residence. The next day, 
September 6, the Japanese government placed Tokyo under 
martial law in order to restore order.46 More than one 
thousand people were either killed or wounded as a result of 
the unrest that convulsed Japan.47
Reporting the upheaval to Secretary of State Elihu Root 
on September 15, Griscom emphasized his conviction that the 
threats to the foreign community in Japan were merely 
incidental to the general rioting. He asserted that the
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stage was set for the popular explosion when "ambitious 
politicians and sensational newspapers combined to inflame 
the imagination of the masses and raise to impossible 
heights their expectations as to what would be the fruits of 
victory."48 He blamed the secretiveness of the Japanese 
government, which prevented "calm discussion of the logical 
results of the war."49 Interestingly, after explaining the 
Japanese outburst to Washington, Griscom then suggested that 
it offered an important case study of the nation's true 
character:
The riots have had particular interest to the world 
at large, for not only have foreigners been to some 
extent concerned, but they have had an opportunity 
of studying the political and social institutions of 
Japan under the strain of trying times. It is only 
in such crises as these that the veil of Oriental 
inscrutability is momentarily lifted and the foreign 
observer enabled to gain a brief glimpse of the 
operation of the Japanese mental process and the 
well-spring of their emotions.50
Similarly, the New York Times ascribed the unrest to 
Tokyo's wartime unwillingness to divulge accurate 
information to its citizens, but also interpreted the chaos 
as a blot upon the Japanese character. The explosive 
response to the Portsmouth Treaty, it was argued, 
demonstrated conclusively that the modernization of Japan 
had been a superficial phenomenon, leaving unchanged its
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basic, primitive nature. A September 8 editorial discussing 
"the grave news from Tokyo" averred,
...it is the (Japanese) Government's fault that (its) 
people do not see and agree that peace on the terms 
concluded and at the time concluded was wise, best, 
and just for Japan...(The rioting) is an astonishing 
"reversal of form" for Japan...It warns us that, 
rapid and astonishing as has been her advance in 
civilization during the past thirty years, and great 
as has been her eagerness to adopt the Western ways, 
she is still far from being wholly regenerate.51
To make matters worse, the editorial continued, Tokyo's 
failure to inform its citizenry of Japan's actual military 
and diplomatic position encouraged misunderstanding which 
jeopardized the future of Japanese-American amity:
The evil consequences of (Tokyo's) stubborn refusal 
to recognize American impartiality may persist to 
trouble our relations with Japan for years...The 
inner Government circle in Tokyo, we may be sure, is 
well aware that Mr. Roosevelt's good offices were in 
a very high degree saving and beneficent for the 
empire...His Imperial Majesty's Government owes it 
first of all to itself, as a measure of prudence and 
safety, and nearly as much to us in common fairness, 
to make it known everywhere throughout the land that 
Mr. Roosevelt in his intercession conducted himself, 
not as the friend of either belligerent alone, but as 
the friend of both and of humanity,...desiring only 
that for the sake both of Russia and Japan there 
should be concluded a "just and lasting peace."52
Roosevelt also blamed Tokyo for Japan's discontent, and 
viewed the Japanese behavior as a vindication of his
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peacemaking efforts and his vision of the postwar balance of 
power in East Asia. To his friend Hermann Speck von 
Sternburg, the German ambassador to the United States, the 
President expressed his chagrin toward the Japanese 
government on September 6:
Why in the world the Japanese statesmen, usually so 
astute, permitted their people to think they had to 
get a large indemnity, I cannot Understand. If they 
had in the beginning blown their trumpets over the 
immense amount they were getting; if they had shown 
how Korea was theirs, Manchuria in effect theirs, 
Port Arthur and Dalny theirs; how they had won a 
triumph which since the days of Napoleon has only 
been paralleled by Germany in 1870 - if they had 
done all this, I think they could have made their 
people feel proud instead of humiliated.53
As a postscript to a letter written to Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge on the same day, Roosevelt commented that the unrest 
in Tokyo was "unpleasant evidence that the Japanese mob - I 
hope not the Japanese people - has had its head completely 
turned," and added that "the peace is evidently a wise one 
from our standpoint, too."54 Two days later, the President 
briefly elaborated this final point in another note to 
Lodge. Claiming that the riots "showed that the (Japanese) 
people have not advanced as far as their Government," he 
asserted that "it is a good thing for mankind that the war 
should have ended as it did, without the Japanese getting an 
enormous indemnity and with them still facing Russia in East
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Asia."55
Perhaps responding to the domestic hostility faced by 
Japan's leaders in the aftermath of the conference,
Roosevelt decided to maintain the secrecy of Tokyo's initial 
requests for American mediation from the spring of 1905. 
Although aware of growing Japanese suspicions of American 
complicity in the framing of the unwelcome peace, the 
President chose not to reveal the information that likely 
would have further incriminated Japan's embattled leaders in 
their compatriots' eyes.56 Roosevelt's decision to maintain 
the confidentiality of his pre-conference correspondence 
with Tokyo despite the anti-American tinge to the Japanese 
outburst attests to the tactfulness with which he dealt with 
Japan's leaders. Unfortunately, suspicions of American 
duplicity lingered among many of Japan's citizens long after 
the immediate reactions to the treaty subsided. This 
undercurrent of tension would color Japanese-American 
relations as competition between the two nations for 
influence in East Asia sharpened through the years 
subsequent to the Portsmouth Conference.
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CONCLUSION:
CASUALTY OF WAR:
ECLIPSE OF THE "OPEN DOOR" AFTER 1905
The meteoric rise of Japan as a significant participant 
in the world arena, as occasioned by the Russo-Japanese War 
of 1904-05, challenged the complacent assumptions of 
American leaders regarding their ability to shape events in 
East Asia. Between 1899 and 1904, Washington had perceived 
the nations of Europe as the greatest threat to the American 
vision of an inviolate China wholly open to international 
commerce. Painfully aware of their inability to defend their 
Asian interests with armed force, American leaders had 
viewed with dismay the European dissection of northeastern 
China in the late 1890s. Nevertheless, since the military 
power of the Western European nations was widely dispersed
I
among their far-flung imperial possessions, Washington 
confidently believed that words alone would suffice to 
maintain conditions in East Asia conducive to American 
interests. The Russian occupation of Manchuria after the 
Boxer Rebellion dealt the first serious blow to this 
assumption. Unable to counteract the Russian aggression, 
American leaders eventually hailed Japan's bold stroke in
1904, hoping that Japanese objectives on the Asian continent 
coincided with their own. However, Japan's armed 
accomplishments during the war with Russia portended a new, 
much greater challenge to the American goals enumerated in 
the "Open Door" notes of 1899 and 1900. By the summer of
1905, American leaders faced a nation which had achieved
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primacy in East Asia. Unencumbered by a territorially 
expansive empire, Japan could afford to concentrate all of 
its formidable armed strength in that region, thereby posing 
a potential threat of unmatched gravity to the "Open Door."
To a significant extent, this threat motivated Theodore 
Roosevelt to convene a peace conference between the
belligerents in the summer of 1905. Unaware of the exhausted
/
condition of the Japanese forces in Manchuria after their 
hard-won victory at Mukden, the President believed that a 
continuation of hostilities would result in the complete 
Japanese domination of Manchuria and possibly Siberia. He 
therefore sought to restore peace before Japan eliminated 
the Russian presence in East Asia. In his vision of the 
postwar balance of power in Asia, each former belligerent 
would check the other's expansionistic impulses, thereby 
upholding the "Open Door" principle. At the same time, 
Roosevelt recognized that Japan's postwar primacy in the 
region necessitated revision of John Hay's precepts.
Japanese control of Korea and southern Manchuria at war's 
end, which Roosevelt supported, forced Washington to relax 
the commitment to Chinese territorial integrity which it had 
assumed with the second "Open Door" note. From Washington's 
point of view, then, the peace of Portsmouth represented an 
attempt to create a compromise between American and Japanese 
objectives in East Asia.
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For his mediation efforts, Roosevelt won accolades from 
other world leaders and from his fellow Americans. In 1906, 
he became the first American president to receive the Nobel 
Peace Prize.1 Unfortunately, Roosevelt's attempt to 
reconcile the "Open Door" principle with Japanese 
expansionism proved short-lived. Even before the decade 
ended, Japan and the United States had embarked upon a 
fateful competition for influence in East Asia which 
undermined the President's conception of the postwar balance 
of power and set the two nations upon a fateful collision 
course.
Some Americans began to sound the alarm while the 
Portsmouth Conference was still in progress. On August 18, 
1905, a New York Times editorial entitled "The Coming 
Struggle with Japan" predicted that Japanese business would 
dominate East Asia as effectively as had Japanese arms. Gone 
was the belief that Japan's war effort had served American 
interests: "...we perceive that the actuating motives of 
Japan and of Russia in their struggle for dominion in the 
East were substantially identical...We furthermore perceive 
that whichever was victorious, we were bound to be the 
losers."2 Instead, the Russo-Japanese War heralded an era 
in which Japan would undersell, and thus eclipse, all 
foreign competition in East Asia:
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.. .We shall grievously mistake (the Japanese) if 
we suppose they will be less efficient in the arts 
of peace than they have been in the arts of war...If 
it be true that price makes the market, another 
terrible taking down awaits the Western world's 
vanity, and this time its pockets will come into 
the reckoning. If there be a yellow peril, 
undoubtedly it is a commercial one.3
Events soon substantiated this grim prognosis for the 
"Open Door" in the territory that had fallen into the 
Japanese orbit. In August of 1905, the American railroad 
magnate Edward H. Harriman had travelled to Tokyo in the 
hopes of cultivating a Japanese-American partnership for the 
development of southern Manchuria. Specifically, he sought a 
joint endeavor to rebuild and expand the region's railways 
in order to advance his own dream of a transportation system 
that would improve international commerce by 
circumnavigating the world. By the time Harriman left Tokyo 
on October 16, 1905, he had secured an agreement that would 
have joined American investors with the Japanese government 
in the expansion and operation of the railways in southern 
Manchuria. On the same day, Komura returned to the Japanese 
capital from his sojourn in the United States. Aghast at 
this proposal, the Foreign Minister promptly vetoed it. In 
large part, his opposition derived from the fear that 
sharing Japan's limited gains with the United States would 
fan the flames of popular discontent at home. In the spring
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of 1906, the American banker Jacob Schiff, who had 
spearheaded American loans to wartime Japan, attempted to 
resurrect Harriman's scheme, but without success.4
Meanwhile, Komura strove to enhance the Japanese 
position in Manchuria through negotiations with Chinese 
leaders. In mid-November of 1905, he travelled to Beijing in 
order to obtain China's official approval of the Portsmouth 
Treaty clauses which granted to Japan the former Russian 
leaseholds on Port Arthur and the railway linking it to 
Changchun to the north. He also sought Chinese concurrence 
with confidential proposals designed to increase Japanese 
control over the development of railways and international 
commerce in Manchuria. Komura's visit to the Chinese capital 
coincided with the Qing government's belated efforts to 
enact political reforms and to centralize its control over 
Chinese territory. As part of their reformist drive, Chinese 
leaders resolved to limit the foreign inroads into their 
nation's territory, and to regain control over the network 
of foreign-owned railroads which increasingly dominated its 
economy.5 The Chinese plenipotentiaries who met Komura and 
Uchida Yasuya (Japan's ambassador to Beijing) in November of 
1905 struggled to defend this growing national consciousness 
against Japanese expansionism. Among the Chinese 
representatives was Yuan Shikai, who had covertly provided 
the Japanese armies with supplies and military information
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obtained through espionage, believing that Japan would 
champion Chinese nationhood in return.6
The Beijing Conference dashed Yuan's hopes. Komura 
abruptly dismissed as "inconsequential matters" Chinese 
proposals for joint control of Port Arthur and recognition 
of Chinese sovereignty in southern Manchuria. Further, he 
contended that the military occupation of southern Manchuria 
conferred upon Japan the right to deny other nations access 
to the region. Invoking the possible threat of a Russian war 
of revenge, Komura also pressured the Chinese to allow Japan 
to construct railways that would penetrate northward toward 
Siberia. By the Sino-Japanese accords signed on December 22, 
1905, Komura laid the foundations for Japan's economic 
domination of Manchuria. He extracted a Chinese pledge not 
to construct railways that would threaten Japanese economic 
interests in Manchuria. Finally, Japan would exercise 
considerable influence in the opening of Manchurian towns to 
international trade.7 Several subordinate Japanese 
diplomats perceived the potential force of Chinese 
nationalism, and advised Tokyo that Japan should cultivate 
Chinese friendship by refraining from such exploitation. 
Komura, however, strongly believed that "Japan should 
doggedly push forward toward its imperial destiny, no matter 
how much the forces of nationalism were giving the fruits of 
victory a sour taste."8 Through the postwar era, the
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Foreign Minister's views would prevail.
The American consul in Mukden, Willard Straight, 
attempted in 1907 to stem this trend by proposing a 
Manchurian bank, financed by Edward H. Harriman, to 
subsidize Chinese administration of Manchuria.
Unfortunately, the financial panic of that year prevented 
implementation of his idea.9 Official American policy soon 
recognized that such schemes had no place in a region that 
had fallen into the Japanese orbit. The Roosevelt 
administration initiated Washington's pragmatic acceptance 
of Japan's continental foothold in the aftermath of the 
Russo-Japanese War. It had officially recognized Japanese 
suzerainty over Korea with the Taft-Katsura Agreement signed 
in July of 1905. In October of 1908, Tokyo instructed 
Takahira to reach another formal understanding with 
Secretary of State Elihu Root regarding Japanese and 
American spheres of influence in East Asia and the Pacific. 
The Root-Takahira Agreement, signed on November 30, 1908, 
invoked the "Open Door" policy for China and proclaimed the 
Pacific Ocean to be an open avenue of trade. However, the 
agreement embodied Roosevelt's pragmatic retreat from the 
original intent of the "Open Door" notes by accepting 
Japanese hegemony over southern Manchuria. A disgruntled 
Willard Straight condemned the agreement as "a terrible 
diplomatic blunder" which signalled American abandonment of
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China to Japanese designs.10 Nonetheless, leaders in 
Washington and Tokyo praised it as a gesture which would lay 
the foundations for subsequent Japanese-American harmony.
Unfortunately, the coexistence which the Root-Takahira 
Agreement apparently heralded proved short-lived. Attempts 
by the United States to enhance its position in postwar East 
Asia (such as Harriman's Manchurian railway venture) 
hastened rapprochement between the two former belligerents, 
which shared a common desire to minimize the American 
economic and political penetration of China. As a result, 
Theodore Roosevelt's vision of the postwar balance of power 
in East Asia began to break down even before he left the 
presidency. On July 25, 1907, after concluding a new 
commercial treaty, Russia and Japan signed two agreements 
regarding their positions on the Asian continent. Only one, 
which reaffirmed the Portsmouth Treaty and declared the 
signatories' support for the "Open Door" in China, was 
publicized. The secret accord delineated their spheres of 
interest in Manchuria and recognized Russia's special 
interests in Outer Mongolia as well as Japan's domination of 
Korea. Subsequently, on July 4, 1910, Tokyo and St. 
Petersburg concluded another entente which again contained 
publicized and confidential clauses. Notably, the public 
portion omitted any obligation to support the "Open Door" 
and Chinese territorial integrity. Instead, it committed the
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signatories to agree upon measures in the event of external 
threats to the status quo in Manchuria. The secret portion 
reaffirmed the line of demarcation separating their 
Manchurian domains and pledged Russia and Japan to common 
action in defense of them.11
Besides threatening American policy objectives in 
China, this Russo-Japanese rapprochement in the years 
immediately following the Portsmouth Conference also 
intensified the potential Japanese menace to American 
possessions in the western Pacific Ocean. Having restored 
amity with its erstwhile adversary, Japan could then 
contemplate expansion into other regions. Weakly defended 
American insular territories in the Pacific, particularly 
the Philippines, presented easy targets for a renewed 
Japanese thrust. At an early stage of the Russo-Japanese 
War, Washington read the Russian plight as a case study of 
the fatal consequences of imperialism without concomitant 
military strength. Theodore Roosevelt and his colleagues 
fervently hoped that the American people would awaken from 
their ingrained sense of isolation from the rest of the 
world and support an expansion of their nation's armed 
forces in order to defend its claim to the status of a world 
power. Writing to the President on February 15, 1904, former 
Secretary of War (and future Secretary of State) Elihu Root 
praised Admiral Togo Heihachiro's initial strike against
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Port Arthur, and then added hopefully, "some people in the 
United States might well learn the lesson that mere bigness 
does not take the place of perfect preparation and readiness 
for instant action."12 Replying to Root the next day, 
Roosevelt concurred, lamenting, "oh, if only our people 
would learn the need of preparedness, and of shaping things 
so that decision and action alike can be instantaneous. Mere 
bigness, if it is also mere flabbiness, means nothing but 
disgrace. "13
On June 11, 1904, the President expressed to Takahira 
and Kaneko his growing misgivings regarding Japan's military 
prowess. Later describing this meeting in a letter to Cecil 
Arthur Spring Rice, Roosevelt recalled,
I told them that I thought their chief danger was 
lest Japan might get the "big head" and enter into a 
general career of insolence and aggression; that 
such a career would undoubtedly be temporarily 
very unpleasant to the rest of the world, but that 
it would in the end be still more unpleasant for 
Japan. I added that though I felt there was a 
possibility of this happening, I did not think it 
probable, because I was a firm believer in the 
Japanese people.14
As a postscript to this letter, Roosevelt commented, "I am 
perfectly well aware that if they win out (against Russia), 
it may possibly mean a struggle between them and us in the 
future; but I hope not and believe not."15
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The enormity of Japan's subsequent armed triumphs 
exacerbated the President's fears of American weakness in 
the Pacific. Writing to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge on June 5, 
1905, Roosevelt averred, "Most certainly the Japanese have 
shown themselves to be terrible foes. There can be none more 
dangerous in all the world." He then emphasized that the 
future of the American insular empire depended not only upon 
amicable relations with Japan, but also upon increased 
military power. Characterizing Japan as "a power jealous, 
sensitive, and warlike, which, if irritated, could at once 
take both the Philippines and Hawaii from us," the President 
concluded with an expression of hope that "we can persuade 
our people...to act in the spirit of generous justice and 
genuine courtesy toward Japan, and to keep the (American) 
navy respectable in numbers and more than respectable in the 
efficiency of its units. If we act thus, we need not fear 
the Japanese. But if, as Brooks Adams says, we show 
ourselves 'opulent, aggressive, and unarmed,' the Japanese 
may some time work us an injury."16
Personnel in the American armed forces soon echoed 
Roosevelt's alarm. In late 1905, an American army officer 
named Homer Lea began work on a remarkable book that was 
finally published in 1909. Lea had witnessed Japanese 
soldiers in action during the suppression of the Boxer 
Rebellion, and had spent time in Japan as chief of staff to
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the Chinese revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen.17 His book, 
entitled The Valor of Ignorance, predicted with stunning 
(and prophetic) detail a future war between the United 
States and Japan in which the latter would attack Hawaii and 
easily wrest the Philippines from American control:
In these (Hawaiian) islands at the present time the 
number of Japanese who have completed their active 
term of service in the imperial armies, a part of 
whom are veterans of the Russian War, exceeds the 
entire field army of the United States. Within 
twenty-four hours after a declaration of war, the 
solitary American battalion that stands guard over 
these islands will disappear...In a military sense, 
the Philippines are closer to Japan than were the 
shores of Manchuria in the Russian War...Only a 
solitary division of troops must be overcome on these 
undefended islands. The conquest of (the Philippines) 
by Japan will be less of a military undertaking than 
was the seizure of Cuba by the United States (in 
1898) .18
According to Lea, the Japanese juggernaut would then easily 
occupy much of the Pacific coast of the mainland United 
States. Pointing out that the bulk of America's armed forces 
were concentrated in the eastern part of the country, he 
asserted that "in a military sense Japan is one-third closer 
to (the states of) Washington, Oregon, and California than 
the military power of the United States."19
The reforms which the American armed forces undertook 
in the decades subsequent to the Russo-Japanese War proved 
inadequate to meet the threat which Roosevelt, Root, and Lea
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(among others) discerned. Many Americans who read The Valor 
of Ignorance prior to 1941 dismissed it as the work of an 
eccentric "prophet of American doom."20 The United States 
Army was particularly resistant to change. In his annual 
message to Congress on December 6, 1904, Roosevelt reminded 
the legislators that "no other civilized nation has, 
relative to its population, such a diminutive army as ours," 
and emphasized the need for improving professionalism among 
American soldiers.21 Continuing abhorrence of large 
standing armies and an equally ingrained sense of immunity 
from overseas events, however, deterred most Americans from 
supporting major enlargements of the land forces of the 
United States.22
Perhaps because it was the primary agent of American 
military power in the Pacific Ocean, the United States Navy 
proved more responsive to the potential threat which Japan 
posed after 1905. In his 1904 annual message to Congress, 
Roosevelt urged naval expansion in dramatic terms? "There is 
no more patriotic duty before us as a people than to keep 
the navy adequate to the needs of this country's position... 
We have undertaken to secure for ourselves our just share in 
the trade of the Orient...Unless our attitude in (this) and 
all similar matters is to be a mere boastful sham, we cannot 
afford to abandon our naval programme."23 Spurred by the 
Japanese victory at Tsushima the following May, Congress
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allocated over $117,500,000 for the construction of warships 
for the fiscal year of 1905; this grant to the navy was 
nearly double that of the previous year.24 Subsequently, in 
the spring of 1908, Congress authorized a policy of 
constructing two battleships per year.25 The United States 
thus became a full participant in the international race for 
naval supremacy, which escalated rapidly as the First World 
War approached.
Japan's naval primacy in the western Pacific after the 
destruction of the Baltic Fleet also induced American naval 
strategists to contemplate the possibility of an eventual 
war between Japan and the United States. Such a threat soon 
apparently emerged. In October of 1906, the school board in 
San Francisco, California, enacted a segregationist law 
which shunted all Chinese and Japanese students to an 
"Oriental Public School."26 Understandably, this ruling 
ignited considerable resentment in Japan. In the United 
States, rumors of Japanese military retaliation abounded for 
several tense months. At Roosevelt's urging, the General 
Board of the United States Navy developed a strategic plan 
for defending American insular possessions against a 
Japanese onslaught. Later termed "Plan Orange," it was the 
first plan in American military history that was developed 
in peacetime for the conduct of war against a designated 
enemy.27 In its original form, it conceded victory to Japan
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in the opening stages of the conflict. Meanwhile, however, 
American warships from the Atlantic and the western Pacific 
would assemble at Hawaii, and eventually launch a massive 
counteroffensive. Although "Plan Orange" underwent numerous 
revisions through subsequent years, it remained the basic 
contingency plan of the United States Navy for war with 
Japan until the eve of American entry into the Second World 
War.28
The United States sought to display to the rest of the 
world the results of these efforts to strengthen the 
American navy in 1907. In December of that year, the "Great 
White Fleet" embarked upon a global voyage; one of the most 
important stops on its itinerary was Tokyo Bay. Given the 
tensions between Japan and the United States at the time, 
many American military and diplomatic personnel feared the 
possibility of a Japanese assault upon the sixteen new 
warships. As a precautionary measure, Roosevelt consulted 
Tokyo, which assured him that the whole fleet would receive 
a cordial welcome there. Also, the President replaced the 
fleet's commander, Captain Robley Evans, universally known 
as "Fighting Bob," with Admiral Charles Sperry, whose 
continued advocacy of Japanese-American cooperation had 
weathered the storm of anti-Japanese sentiment among the 
upper echelons of the American navy. Though Sperry later 
recalled that he "had been walking on eggs"29 when the
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fleet steamed into Tokyo Bay in late October of 1908, the 
visit to Japan passed without incident. According to the 
historian Richard D. Challener, the Great White Fleet's 
voyage to Japan, with the pro-Japanese Sperry at its helm, 
"proved to be an adroit combination of the olive branch and 
the sword."30 It apparently achieved the President's dual 
goals of persuading Japan of the ability of the United 
States to defend its interests in the Pacific and East Asia, 
and of reaffirming Japanese-American harmony.
However, continued crises in Japanese-American 
relations underscored American weakness in the Pacific. In 
March of 1907, Roosevelt defused the tensions with Japan 
arising from San Francisco's racism by negotiating a 
"Gentleman's Agreement," in which Japan agreed to limit 
emigration to the United States in return for a revocation 
of the offensive law. Unfortunately, the restored calm was 
shattered two months later when anti-Japanese riots erupted 
in the California city.31 The President, by then fully 
aware of Japan's need to recover from its war with Russia, 
doubted that Tokyo would interpret San Francisco's 
xenophobia as a casus belli.32 Many Japanese statesmen 
likewise denied the possibility of war between Japan and the 
United States at that time. Count Hayashi Tadasu, Japan's 
ambassador to Britain, wrote, "...a future war between 
America and Japan is only journalistic talk...a war between
148
the two countries can never take place under any 
circumstances...Japan regards America as her benefactor, and 
she is deeply indebted to her for much help and for many 
improvements. In reality, the feelings of Japan for America 
are as cordial as they were fifty years ago."33
Nevertheless, this new crisis compelled American 
military leaders to retreat from their original strategy in 
the Pacific, particularly with regard to their plans for the 
defense of the Philippines. In December of 1907, General 
Leonard Wood, then the commander of the Philippine Division 
of the American army, argued that Manila Bay would be the 
only region in the archipelago in which American forces 
could fend off a Japanese strike until rescue by the navy.34 
The following year, 1908, the American navy established its 
main Pacific base east of the Philippines, at Pearl Harbor 
on the Hawaiian island of Oahu.35 Meanwhile, the Great 
White Fleet's visit to Tokyo Bay induced Japan to accelerate 
its own naval production.36 Roosevelt, cognizant that the 
American position in the western Pacific was hostage to 
amicable relations between the United States and Japan, 
condemned the "infernal fools in California" and asserted 
that, should such "reckless insults" provoke war with Japan, 
"it will be the (American) Nation which will pay the 
consequences."37 The Philippine archipelago, once perceived 
as a vital stepping stone between the United States and
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China, had become, in Roosevelt's words, "America's heel of 
Achilles" in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War.38
The Russo-Japanese War and the Portsmouth Conference 
thus inaugurated an era of competition between the United 
States and Japan for influence in East Asia that would 
intensify through the next four decades. After 1905,
American leaders regarded Japan as the primary threat to 
their Asian objectives. Conversely, lingering suspicions of 
American collusion with Russia during the Portsmouth 
Conference, coupled with the postwar attempts of the United 
States to enhance its position on the Asian mainland, 
convinced many Japanese that their erstwhile friend sought 
to thwart Japan's quest for "great power" status in the 
world arena. Contrary to the initial expectations of the 
leaders in Tokyo and Washington, then, the tumultuous events 
of 1904-1905 set their respective nations on a collision 
course that would culminate in armed struggle.
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